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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The question is not what the Senator means, but what is the 
legitimate meaning and import of the terms employed in the bill. . . . 
What are civil rights? What are the rights which you, I, or any citizen 
of this country enjoy? . . . [H]ere you use a generic term which in its 
most comprehensive signification includes every species of right that 
man can enjoy other than those the foundation of which rests 
exclusively in nature and in the law of nature.1 
It is widely agreed among legal academics and judges that 
originalism cannot explain or justify the United States Supreme Court’s 
1967 ruling in Loving v. Virginia,2 which held that laws banning racial 
intermarriage were unconstitutional. Originalism is a theory of 
constitutional interpretation expounded by Justices Antonin Scalia and 
Clarence Thomas as well as by former Judge Robert H. Bork and former 
Attorney General Edwin Meese III. Originalists believe that the 
constitutional text should be interpreted according to the original 
meaning of the words used as that meaning would have been unveiled in 
contemporary dictionaries, grammar books, and other indicia of objective 
public meaning.3 The critics of originalism, from Richard Posner4 to 
Cass Sunstein5 to Jack Balkin6 and Michael Klarman,7 all say that the 
alleged inability of originalism to explain Loving v. Virginia, which is 
one of the great human rights triumphs of the last fifty years, is a major 
blow against the Scalia-Thomas theory of judging. Even the originalist 
scholar, former Judge Michael McConnell, who has offered an originalist 
defense of Brown v. Board of Education,8 falls silent when it comes to 
defending Loving v. Virginia on originalist grounds. McConnell 
 
 1. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1st Sess. 477 (1866) (statement of Sen. Willard Saulsbury). 
 2. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 3. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 
144 (1990); see also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 23–41 (1997) (defending textualism over legislative history). 
 4. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 247–249 (1995) (arguing that originalism 
cannot support the outcome in Brown v. Board of Education much less Loving v. Virginia). 
 5. CASS SUNSTEIN, Debate on Radicals in Robes, ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER CENTURY OF 
DEBATE 293 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007) (arguing that Michael McConnell cannot offer an 
originalist defense of Loving v. Virginia). 
 6. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 228 (2011). 
 7. Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to 
Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1919 (1995). 
 8. Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 
947 (1995). 
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evidently feels that there are just too many statements in the 
congressional legislative history from the 1860s and 1870s in support of 
laws banning racial intermarriage for Loving v. Virginia to be defensible 
on originalist grounds.9 McConnell undoubtedly thinks Loving is right as 
a matter of policy and that it ought never to be overruled, but he is unable 
to say he would have joined the opinion when it was first handed down 
in 1967.10 
We think the conventional wisdom on originalism and Loving is 
incorrect. In fact, we think that a proper application of Scalia-style 
originalism and textualism leads rather easily to the conclusion that 
Loving was rightly decided. The mistake Scalia’s critics make is that they 
rely exclusively on the statements made in the legislative history of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
suggest the framers of those Acts did not expect them to legalize racial 
intermarriage. Scalia-style originalists and textualists, however, should 
reject the use of any legislative history as a tool in statutory or 
constitutional interpretation. Originalists believe that it is the original 
public meaning of the words of a legal text that govern and not the 
subjective spin put on that text by members of Congress in the legislative 
history.11 In other words, Scalia-style originalists should not concern 
themselves with original intent. 
In our view, originalists think that lawmaking in a democracy is a 
public act whereby the American people, their representatives in the two 
houses of Congress, and the President all agree on a text, and it is that 
agreed upon text which becomes the law. Isolated comments by 
representatives and senators involved in the bill drafting process are not 
law nor are they reliable guides to what is the law. Such comments do 
not pass the hurdle of bicameralism and presentment set out in Article I, 
Section 7, and they are often spin that reflects either wishful thinking by 
those making the statements or possibly even inaccurate personal views 
about what a prospective law actually means.12 Finally, judges should 
look to the plain textual meaning of the law as it is written when 
 
 9. See id. at 1018. 
 10. See id. 
 11. BORK, supra note 3, at 144. 
 12. For a non-formalist discussion of statutory interpretation, see GUIDO CALABRESI, A 
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). 
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interpreting it in the courts rather than looking to indicia of legislative 
intent.13 
The best indicia of original public meaning come from dictionaries 
and grammar books that are widely in use at the time a law is passed. 
Newspaper editorials might also be helpful in recovering the objective 
original public meaning of a newly enacted legal text. Statements by 
senators and representatives involved in the drafting process, in contrast, 
will usually be unknown to the general public when a law is passed and 
will therefore not be part of the original public meaning of the law. 
Members of the public who want to write their congressmen and lobby 
them with respect to a law will usually base their correspondence on the 
legal text under consideration, but they will not typically have read a 
committee report or isolated random statements in the Congressional 
Record. 
There are exceptional speeches by sponsors of major legislation, 
which are widely publicized, and one could wonder if such speeches are 
indicative of original meaning. Arguably, a famous example of such a 
writing in American history is The Federalist Papers which were 
published when the Constitution was up for ratification in New York 
State and which may have swayed voters to approve the Constitution. 
Even these kinds of sponsor speeches or opinion pieces must be greatly 
discounted by the fact that the voters will often know that the proponents 
of a law may be willing to lie about what a proposed law means in order 
to get it enacted into law. For example, when the Equal Rights 
Amendment was up for ratification in the states, during the 1970s, its 
proponents tended to minimize its importance while its opponents 
predicted that it would lead to a parade of horribles. Everyone then living 
“knew” that if the ERA was ever ratified, its proponents would have 
promptly claimed that it changed everything while the ERA’s opponents 
would have said the opposite. Our point here is that even when sponsors’ 
reassuring, mellifluous words are widely publicized, as with The 
Federalist Papers, this does not mean the sponsors are being honest nor 
does the public necessarily assume that the sponsors are being honest. 
Just because a sponsors’ speech or opinion writings are widely available 
does not suffice to show that those comments accurately captured the 
original public meaning of a legal text.14 
 
 13. For an excellent discussion of textualism that comports fully with our understanding, see 
John Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287 (2010). 
 14. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1337, 1348–50 (1998). 
1.CALABRESI.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2013  2:56 PM 
1393 Originalism and Loving v. Virginia 
 1397 
Suppose Congress passed a statute that said the colors of the 
American flag were to be red, white, and blue, but that many statements 
in the congressional record indicate that important members of Congress 
understood the word “blue” to mean “green.” Suppose further that the 
public understood the word “blue” to mean “blue” in accordance with its 
commonly accepted public meaning as revealed in dictionaries. The 
color of the flag in this case would be red, white, and blue 
notwithstanding Congress’s intent that “blue” actually means “green.” 
We are governed by the formal legal texts that Congress enacts into law 
and not by the unenacted intentions of the members of Congress who 
wrote those texts. For the same reason, we are governed by the laws our 
ancestors made during Reconstruction and not by their unenacted 
intentions or expectations when they made those laws. 
Intent is a slippery enough concept when it is applied to one 
individual but it dissolves into utter meaningless when it is applied to a 
group of people like the members of Congress who voted for the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment. We cannot possibly 
say what a group so large and so discordant “intended” to legislate, but 
we can read the texts they enacted into law with a dictionary and a 
grammar book to discover the original public meaning of those texts. 
Original public meaning is an objectively verifiable phenomenon that a 
court can reconstruct. It is a cousin to the reasonable man standard 
familiar to lawyers from tort law. It is possible to say with a high degree 
of certainty what the original public meaning of a legal text was, even if 
the intentions of those who voted for it were variable and contradictory. 
It may even be the case that a majority of Congress could vote for a law 
based on a completely inaccurate understanding of what the law meant. 
Legislatures often enact conflicting laws as was illustrated for many 
years when Congress voted simultaneously for funds to support anti-
smoking commercials and for funds to provide financial support to 
tobacco farmers. Why would Congress vote simultaneously for many 
decades to discourage and to encourage the production of tobacco? The 
answer is that a swing group of voters in both Houses wanted to please 
both the anti-smoking lobby and tobacco growers. Both lobbies were 
powerful and the road to re-election required pleasing them both, so 
members of Congress went on record both against and for tobacco use. 
Unfortunately, this type of behavior occurs in Congress frequently, 
which is why it is a fool’s errand to look at legislative history to figure 
out what a legal text means. Members of Congress often vote for a bill 
and then deny that it means what it says because that way they can curry 
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favor both with the bill’s proponents and with its opponents. This is 
essentially what happened during Reconstruction. Congress voted to give 
African Americans equal civil rights with white Americans while 
denying this meant an end to laws against racial intermarriage and to 
school segregation. 
The flaw with all the writing that has been done to date on 
originalism and laws against racial intermarriage is that it asks the wrong 
question. Instead of asking what the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the 
Fourteenth Amendment originally meant when they were enacted into 
law, the commentators and Justices have asked what Congress intended 
to do when it enacted those laws. Commentators have then extrapolated 
from the fact that the Reconstruction framers expected their laws to be 
consistent with segregation in schools and bans on racial intermarriage to 
the conclusion that as a matter of original intent Jim Crow segregation 
was constitutional. We agree with Yale Law Professor Jack Balkin that 
all the talk about original public expectations is hogwash and that it is the 
semantic original public meaning of the enacted texts that should 
govern.15 Once one correctly applies Scalia-style originalism and 
textualism to the Fourteenth Amendment, it becomes very easy to see 
why Loving v. Virginia is correct. 
We begin our analysis in Part II below by discussing the historical 
origins of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to show how it is that so many commentators have come to 
the wrong conclusion that anti-miscegenation laws are consistent with 
the historical meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. We then turn in 
Part III to a discussion of the text of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to show why laws against racial 
intermarriage clearly violate the semantic meaning of those enactments 
using contemporary nineteenth century dictionary definitions. We rely 
heavily on precisely those dictionaries that would have been most readily 
available to the American general public in the 1860s. In Part IV, we 
quote extensively from newspaper editorials discussing the passage of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to show that our semantic reading of the Act 
based on contemporary dictionaries was in fact the meaning that was 
widely held by the public. This discussion reveals a widespread public 
awareness of the radical nature of the Reconstruction enactments and the 
difficulty of the social upheaval that might result. Finally, in Part V, we 
show that two state supreme courts in the 1870’s held that anti-
 
 15. BALKIN, supra note 6, at 6–7. 
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miscegenation laws violated the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the 
Fourteenth Amendment. We take these decisions to be further proof of 
the rightness of our reading of the Fourteenth amendment. We do not 
address the correctness of Brown v. Board of Education in this Article 
because it raises separate and distinct issues that we will address in 
another article, which is a companion to this Article.16 We do think that 
Brown, like Loving v. Virginia, is correct as a matter of the original 
public understanding. 
II. THE MISTAKEN RELIANCE ON EVIDENCE OF ORIGINAL INTENT 
The mistaken reliance on evidence of original intent rather than of 
original meaning is quite directly the fault of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
When the Court in 1953 directed re-argument of Brown v. Board of 
Education, the Court asked the parties to brief the following questions: 
1. What evidence is there that the Congress which submitted and the 
State legislatures and conventions which ratified the Fourteenth 
Amendment contemplated or did not contemplate, understood or did 
not understand, that it would abolish segregation in public schools? 
2. If neither the Congress in submitting nor the States in ratifying the 
Fourteenth Amendment understood that compliance with it would 
require the immediate abolition of segregation in public schools, was it 
nevertheless the understanding of the framers of the Amendment 
(a) that future Congresses might, in the exercise of their power 
under section 5 of the Amendment, abolish such segregation, or 
(b) that it would be within the judicial power, in light of future 
conditions, to construe the Amendment as abolishing such 
segregation of its own force? 
3. On the assumption that the answers to questions 2 (a) and (b) do not 
dispose of the issue, is it within the judicial power, in construing the 
Amendment, to abolish segregation in public schools?17 
These questions all focus on what Congress contemplated or did not 
contemplate, and on what it understood or what it did not understand, 
when it passed the Fourteenth Amendment in the 1860s. This is, 
however, the wrong set of questions to ask! What matters is not what 
 
 16. Steven G. Calabresi & Michael Perl, Originalism and Brown v. Board of Education 
(forthcoming 2012) (unpublished edited senior research manuscript) (on file with authors). 
 17. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 970, 972 (1953). 
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Congress thought it was doing when it passed the Fourteenth 
Amendment but rather what did the words of the Amendment, read in 
light of its predecessor the Civil Rights Act of 1866, actually mean. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in 1953 asked for briefing on a set of 
questions that might interest a devotee of a jurisprudence of original 
intent but not a devotee of a jurisprudence of original meaning.18 Instead 
of asking for briefs on the question of what members of Congress 
thought they were doing, the Supreme Court ought to have instead asked 
for briefs on what Congress actually did. 
Having asked the wrong questions, the Supreme Court quite 
predictably got a useless set of answers as the opinion in Brown v. Board 
of Education made clear. Chief Justice Warren pronounced that the 
judgment of history was “inconclusive” because  
[t]he most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly 
intended them to remove all legal distinctions among “all persons born 
or naturalized in the United States.” Their opponents, just as certainly, 
were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments 
and wished them to have the most limited effect. What others in 
Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined 
with any degree of certainty.19  
Therefore, Chief Justice Warren concluded that  
[i]n approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 
when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. 
Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light 
of its full development and its present place in American life 
throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if 
segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal 
protection of the laws.20 
In other words, the U.S. Supreme Court asked for briefs 
psychoanalyzing the group intent of the Congress that adopted the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and when the Court got back the predictable 
answer that different members of Congress intended different things, it 
threw up its hands in despair and decided the case based on current 
 
 18. Compare RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2nd ed. 1997) (arguing for a jurisprudence of original intent), with 
BORK, supra note 3 (arguing for a jurisprudence of original meaning). 
 19. Id. at 489. 
 20. Id. at 492–93. 
1.CALABRESI.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2013  2:56 PM 
1393 Originalism and Loving v. Virginia 
 1401 
public policy needs. As Alexander Bickel said in another context, “No 
answer is what the wrong question begets.”21 
The Supreme Court should not have asked in 1953 for information 
on what the Reconstruction Congress contemplated or understood. They 
should have asked for briefing on what the words of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment originally meant. This is an 
entirely different question from the one asked by the Court. Three 
generations of commentators have puzzled over the original intent of the 
Reconstruction Congress since Brown v. Board of Education was handed 
down in 1954. The question is both unanswerable and irrelevant. Number 
one, there was no majority intent and, number two, it is the laws that the 
Reconstruction Congress passed that bind us today and not Congress’s 
unenacted intentions. 
The leading commentators on Brown v. Board of Education took 
their cues from Chief Justice Warren’s opinion and assumed (1) that it 
was the intentions of the members of the Reconstruction Congress that 
matter and not the texts they enacted; (2) that the Members of the 
Reconstruction Congress clearly did not intend to outlaw school 
segregation or to create a right to racial intermarriage; and (3) that those 
rights had to therefore be created afresh by the U.S. Supreme Court 
evolutively interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment and relying on the 
so-called living Constitution.22 This approach is epitomized in Alexander 
Bickel’s famous 1955 essay in the Harvard Law Review entitled The 
Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision.23 Because 
Bickel’s article epitomizes the mistaken focus on original intent over 
original meaning, we will summarize his argument and the key evidence 
he relies on in some detail here. 
Bickel begins by noting that the briefs and historical appendices filed 
with the Supreme Court in Brown “amounted to the most extensive 
presentation of historical materials ever made to the Court.”24 Bickel 
elaborates that “[t]he heart of this mass of evidence is to be found in the 
 
 21. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 103 (1962). 
 22. Among the commentators who took this view on Brown v. Board of Education were 
BERGER, supra note 18 (arguing that Brown was wrongly decided); Alexander M. Bickel, The 
Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955); Herbert 
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959) (critiquing 
the lack of reasoning from principle in Brown); see also BALKIN, supra note 6 (arguing in 2011 that 
Brown v. Board of Education can only be justified by living, evolutive originalism). 
 23. Bickel, supra note 22. 
 24. Id. at 6. 
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reported debates of the first session of the 39th Congress,”25 and he adds 
that “the debates of the Congress which submitted, and the journals and 
documents of the legislatures which ratified, the amendment provide the 
most direct and unimpeachable indication of original purpose and 
understanding—to the extent, of course, that any such indication is to be 
found.”26 Bickel’s article goes on to rely exclusively on the legislative 
history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Bickel never analyzes any of the legal texts that emerged 
from Reconstruction nor did he even discuss them. Bickel never cites 
even a single dictionary or grammar book nor does he make any other 
effort whatsoever to recapture the original public meaning of the words 
of the laws that the Reconstruction Congress passed. 
Thus, the entire body of evidence Bickel relies on in his sixty-five-
page Harvard Law Review essay on Brown is completely irrelevant to a 
Scalia-style formalist, textualist, or originalist. The only possible use that 
such an originalist could make of Bickel’s sources would be to use them 
as aids to confirm some generally understood, socially held, objective 
public meaning. Bickel does not use his sources in that way, however, 
and he instead treats isolated snippets of legislative history reflecting the 
comments of one member of Congress in floor debates as if they were 
the law. Bickel’s essay is perhaps interesting historically, but it has 
essentially nothing to do with law. Who cares what the Members of the 
39th Congress thought they were doing? What we care about is what 
they actually did. 
The debates in the 39th Congress were triggered by the North’s 
reaction to the passage of laws in many southern states oppressing the 
newly freed African American citizens in the South and to the election 
by Southern voters of important ex-Confederate officials to high public 
offices. The laws taking away the rights of African American freedmen 
were called “The Black Codes,” and Northerners believed these laws 
were meant to relegate the freedmen to second-class social status by 
making them not much better off than when they were slaves. 
The Black Codes were seen as a de facto nullification by the South 
of the emancipation of the slaves, and they were seen in the North as an 
effort by the South to reverse in practice its military loss in the Civil 
War. The Black Codes 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 6–7. 
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perpetuated or created many discriminations in the criminal law by 
applying unequal penalties to Negroes for recognized offenses and by 
specifying offences for Negroes only.  Laws which prohibited Negroes 
from keeping weapons or from selling liquor were typical of the latter. 
Examples of discriminatory penalties were the laws which made it a 
capital offence for a Negro to rape a white woman, or to assault a white 
woman with intent to rape . . . . In addition to the discriminations of the 
criminal laws, post-war black codes hedged in the Negroes with a 
series of restraints on their business dealings of even the simplest form. 
Though in many states the Negro could acquire property, Mississippi 
put sharp limitations on that right. But most restrictive were the 
provisions concerning contracts for personal service. Many statutes 
called for specific enforcement of labor contracts against freedmen, 
with provisions to facilitate capture should a freedman try to escape. 
Vagrancy laws made it a misdemeanor for a Negro to be without a 
long-term contract of employment; conviction was followed by a fine, 
payable by a white man who could then set the criminal to work for 
him until the benefactor had been completely reimbursed for his 
generosity.27 
The Black Codes thus denied the freedmen liberty of contract and 
greatly impaired their right to hold property. The Codes forced free 
African Americans into labor relationships, which were scarcely 
different from slavery. 
The 39th Congress responded to the Black Codes by drafting the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, the first major civil rights law ever to be passed 
by the U.S. Congress. On January 29, 1866, Senator Lyman Trumbull of 
Illinois brought up a Civil Rights Bill in the U.S. Senate. Section 1 of 
Senator Trumbull’s bill provided as follows: 
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign 
power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens 
of the United States; that there shall be no discrimination in civil rights 
or immunities among the inhabitants of any State or Territory of the 
United States on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
slavery; but the inhabitants of every race and color, without regard to 
any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, 
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United 
 
 27. John P. Frank and Robert F. Munro, The Original Understanding of “Equal Protection of 
the Laws,” 1972 WASH. U. L. Q. 421, 445–446. See generally PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 301–10 (5th ed. 2006) (summarizing 
historical origins of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give 
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and 
personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by 
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishments, pains, and 
penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or 
custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.28 
Section 1 of Senator Trumbull’s bill thus overturned Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, which held that free African Americans were not citizens of 
the United States, and it established complete equality as to all civil 
rights among the white and African races. Section 2 of Senator 
Trumbull’s bill provided for criminal penalties, including imprisonment 
of up to one year in jail, for any person who under color of law deprived 
a citizen of these fundamental civil rights. 
There ensued in the Senate, which passed Senator Trumbull’s bill 
verbatim, and then later in the House of Representatives much debate 
over the general protection given to civil rights in the abstract at the 
beginning of Section 1 prior to the specific enumeration of the equal 
rights to 
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to 
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal 
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for 
the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and 
shall be subject to like punishments.29 
The very general opening language of Section 1, which came to be 
called the general civil rights formula, provided “that there shall be no 
discrimination in civil rights or immunities among the inhabitants of any 
State or Territory of the United States on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of slavery.”30 Critics of the Civil Rights Bill seized 
on this prefatory language, which they feared was subject to a 
“latitudinarian” construction,31 and complained that it would go beyond 
overturning the Black Codes and that it would give African Americans 
the right to vote, the right to serve on juries, the right to attend integrated 
schools with white children, and the right to racial intermarriage. 
 
 28. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. BICKEL, supra note 21, at 9. 
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The supporters of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 countered that the bill 
gave only equal civil rights to African Americans and that it did not 
confer political rights,32 such as the right to vote or to serve on a jury. 
Senator William Saulsbury of Delaware, a Democrat, complained: 
The question is not what the Senator means, but what is the legitimate 
meaning and import of the terms employed in the bill . . . . What are 
civil rights? What are the rights which you, I, or any citizen of this 
country enjoy? . . . [H]ere you use a generic term which in its most 
comprehensive signification includes every species of right that man 
can enjoy other than those the foundation of which rests exclusively in 
nature and in the law of nature.33 
Senator Reverdy Johnson then objected that the Civil Rights Act 
would ban laws forbidding racial intermarriage, but Senator Trumbull 
and another supporter of the bill disagreed.34 They claimed laws against 
racial intermarriage were equal because such laws said that blacks could 
only marry blacks and whites could only marry whites.35 The Civil 
Rights Bill passed the Senate in unamended form on February 2 by a 
vote of thirty-three to twelve.36 The debate on the Bill then moved over 
to the House of Representatives.37 
The debate in the House of Representatives was heated and included 
objections from a number of speakers that the Bill would require school 
integration, racial intermarriage, and voting rights for African 
Americans.38 The Bill’s supporters denied this and claimed that the 
general civil rights proviso at the start of the Bill protected only the 
rights enumerated at the end of the Bill which included the right 
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to 
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal 
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for 
the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and 
shall be subject to like punishment[s]. . . .39 
 
 32. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 476 (1866) (statement of Sen. Lyman Trumbull); 
BICKEL, supra note 21, at 13. 
 33. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 477 (1866) (statement of Sen.  William 
Saulsbury). 
 34. Id. at 505–06. 
 35. Id. at 505. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 606–07. 
 38. Id. at 1121. 
 39. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27. 
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Supporters of the general civil rights proviso thus claimed that it was 
code for only the specifically enumerated rights and not for anything 
else.40 At one point they even amended the Bill to specifically deny that 
it conferred a right to vote.41 
Bickel says that “[t]he final expression of Republican misgivings 
was the most formidable” and most “decisive” because it came from 
Congressman John A. Bingham, a leader of his party in the House.42 
Bingham wanted to “strike the [language] at the head of Section [1,] 
which forbade all ‘discrimination in civil rights [and] immunities’ and to 
substitute for” the criminal penalty imposed on violators of the bill a 
right on the part of those discriminated against to file a civil suit for 
damages.43 Bingham prevailed and the general civil rights language at 
the head of Section 1 was struck.44 Representative James F. Wilson of 
Iowa, who was managing the Bill in the House, brought the new revised 
version before the House and made a very important statement. 
Representative Wilson said: 
Mr. Speaker, the amendment which has just been read proposes to 
strike out the general terms relating to civil rights. I do not think it 
materially changes the bill; but some gentlemen were apprehensive that 
the words we propose to strike out might give warrant for a 
latitudinarian construction not intended.45 
Representative Wilson added that the specific ban on African 
American suffrage was no longer needed, and he proceeded to push for a 
vote in which the House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed the 
Bill over Representative Bingham’s dissenting vote.46 “Two days later 
the Senate concurred in the House amendments,” and “[t]he President 
vetoed the bill on March 27.”47 President Andrew Johnson, “[i]n 
discussing section 1, . . . conceded that the only rights safeguarded by it 
were those enumerated. He did not attack the section on the basis of any 
alarmist ‘latitudinarian’ construction. His objections were” based on the 
claim that Congress lacked the constitutional power under Section 2 of 
 
 40. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH  CONG., 1ST SESS. 1293–95 (1866). 
 41. Id. at 1162. 
 42. Bickel, supra note 22, at 22. 
 43. Id.; CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1290–93 (1866). 
 44. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1366–67 (1866). 
 45. Id. at 1366 (1866) (emphasis added); see also Bickel, supra note 22, at 28. 
 46. Bickel, supra note 22, at 28. 
 47. Id. 
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the Thirteenth Amendment to pass a general civil rights bill.48 Since the 
Thirteenth Amendment banned only slavery and not deprivations of civil 
rights, President Johnson claimed that Congress’s power to enforce the 
Thirteenth Amendment included only a power to pass federal laws 
against slavery and not federal laws on the subject of civil rights.49 
The Senate overrode the President’s veto on April 4, 1866.50 “There 
were speeches by Trumbull, Reverdy Johnson, Cowan, and Garrett 
Davis, Democrat of Kentucky, who was still maintaining that the bill 
would abolish antimiscegenation statutes and mark the end of 
segregation in hotels and railroad cars and churches.”51 On April 9, the 
House overrode the veto.52 It marked the very first time in seventy-seven 
years of American constitutional history that a presidential veto on an 
important piece of legislation had ever been overridden. 
The supporters of Reconstruction feared that the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 might be struck down by the federal courts on the ground that 
Congress had exceeded its power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment 
by passing the Act. This was of course the objection to the Act that had 
been expressed by President Johnson in his veto message. Supporters of 
Reconstruction were also afraid that a new Congress might be elected 
with a southern and Copperhead majority and that that new Congress 
might repeal the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Congress therefore set to work 
on writing and passing the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 
The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was at a bare minimum to 
write the Civil Rights Act of 1866 into the Constitution so that there 
would be no possibility of it being held unconstitutional or of it being 
repealed by a later Congress.53 
Thaddeus Stevens spoke in favor of the Fourteenth Amendment as 
follows in a speech to the House of Representatives: 
This amendment . . . allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of 
the States, so far that the law which operates upon one man shall 
operate equally upon all. Whatever law punishes a white man for a 
 
 48. Id. at 28–29 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39TH  CONG., 1ST SESS. 1680–81 (1866)). 
 49. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1680–81 (1866). 
 50. Bickel, supra note 22, at 29. 
 51. Id. (emphasis added). 
 52. Id. 
 53. This history of the origins of the Fourteenth Amendment is elaborated in John Harrison, 
Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992). See ERIC FONER, 
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877 (1988); WILLIAM E. NELSON, 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988). 
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crime shall punish the black man precisely in the same way. . . . 
 Whatever law protects the white man shall afford “equal” protection 
to the black man. Whatever means of redress is afforded to one shall be 
afforded to all. Whatever law allows the white man to testify in court 
shall allow the man of color to do the same. These are great advantages 
over their present codes. . . . I need not enumerate these partial and 
oppressive laws. Unless the Constitution should restrain them those 
States will . . . crush to death the hated freedmen. Some answer, “Your 
civil rights bill secures the same things.” That is partly true, but a law is 
repealable by a majority. And I need hardly say that the first time that 
the South with their Copperhead allies obtain the command of 
Congress it will be repealed. . . . This Amendment once adopted cannot 
be amended without two-thirds of Congress. That they will hardly 
get.54 
There was a widespread consensus that the proposed Fourteenth 
Amendment constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act of 1866. M. Russell 
Thayer of Pennsylvania said that “[a]s I understand it, [the Fourteenth 
Amendment] is but incorporating in the Constitution . . . the principle of 
the civil rights bill . . . [so that it] shall be forever incorporated.”55 
Another congressman, John Broomall described the Amendment as “the 
Civil Rights Act ‘in another shape.’”56 Bickel says that “[g]iven the evils 
represented by the Black Codes, which were foremost in the minds of all 
men, it must be supposed that [the final] language [of the Fourteenth 
Amendment] was deemed to protect all the rights specifically 
enumerated in the Civil Rights Bill.”57 Bickel adds that “[i]n this 
atmosphere, section I became the subject of a stock generalization: it was 
dismissed as embodying and, in one sense for the Republicans, in 
another for the Democrats and Conservatives, ‘constitutionalizing’ the 
Civil Rights Act.”58 
One question that immediately arises is how did the language of the 
second sentence of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporate 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866? That sentence reads: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
 
 54. BREST ET AL., supra note 27, at 308. 
 55. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Bickel, supra note 22, at 57. 
 58. Id. at 58. 
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process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.59 
The relevant final text of the amended Civil Rights Act of 1866 
provided: 
[C]itizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous 
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment 
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have 
the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to 
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to 
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal 
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for 
the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and 
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none 
other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary 
notwithstanding.60 
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment believed that the rights 
“to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to 
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, 
and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security 
of person and property” were all “privileges or immunities” of state 
citizenship which no State could “abridge” (i.e., “shorten” or lessen”) in 
the making or enforcing of any law.61 At a bare minimum then, the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause included the 
enumerated rights in the Civil Rights Act such as the right to make or 
enforce contracts. The phrase “privileges or immunities” like the phrase 
“civil rights,” which was struck from the 1866 Act, might mean a whole 
lot more than just the rights enumerated in the 1866 Act. But no one 
doubted that at least the 1866 Act was constitutionalized. Even Raoul 
Berger, who was to become famous for his narrow interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, conceded that the Amendment codified the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866.62 
One opponent of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Andrew 
Jackson Rogers, complained: 
This section . . . is no more nor less than an attempt to embody in 
the Constitution . . . that outrageous and miserable civil rights bill. . . . 
 
 59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 60. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (emphasis added). 
 61. Harrison, supra note 53, at 1387, 1402 n.53. 
 62. BERGER, supra note 18. 
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. . . . 
. . . What are privileges and immunities? Why, sir, all the rights 
we have under the laws of the country are embraced under the 
definition of privileges and immunities. The right to vote is a privilege. 
The right to marry is a privilege. The right to contract is a privilege. 
The right to be a juror is a privilege. The right to be a judge or 
President of the United States is a privilege. I hold if that ever becomes 
a part of the fundamental law of the land it will prevent any State from 
refusing to allow anything to anybody embraced under this term of 
privileges and immunities. . . . It will result in a revolution worse than 
that through which we have just passed.63 
Rogers had a valid point. The term “privileges or immunities” was 
obviously lifted from the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 
Section 2 of the Constitution.64 It is clear in that context that privileges 
and immunities include all civil rights such that one state was obligated 
to give to all visiting out-of-state citizens the same civil rights, i.e., 
privileges and immunities, as it gave to its own citizens. States need not 
give out-of-staters the same political rights to vote in state elections or 
serve on state juries as are enjoyed by their own citizens, but they must 
give out-of-state citizens the same civil rights they give their own 
citizens. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment thus resurrected the general guarantee of equal civil rights 
that had been struck from the Civil Rights Act of 1866! Henceforth, no 
state could make or enforce any law that abridged the civil rights of 
citizens of the United States. 
Since the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment makes it clear 
that all persons born in the United States were citizens both of the United 
States and of the state wherein they reside it follows ineluctably that both 
the privileges and immunities of national citizenship and the privileges 
and immunities of state citizenship are protected.65 In fact, the privileges 
 
 63. Bickel, supra note 22, at 48. 
 64. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
 65. But see The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872); Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive 
Due Process After Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1517 (2008). Modern scholarship on the 
original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause began with John Harrison’s article 
Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, supra note 53, which argued that the Clause 
was on an anti-discrimination guarantee and not a fount of substantive due process individual rights. 
Philip Hamburger reaches the same conclusion in Privileges or Immunities, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 61 
(2011). Akhil Reed Amar and Randy Barnett read the Clause as protecting both against 
discrimination and as conferring unenumerated individual rights. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (forthcoming 2012); 
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enumerated in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, like the right to make and 
enforce contracts, were all common law privileges of state citizenship. It 
follows a fortiori that other common law privileges or immunities of 
state citizenship, like the right to marry, must be protected as well. In 
fact, since the right to marry is just a subset of the right to make a 
particular form of contract, the right to marry a person of another race 
must have been protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1866, even without 
the Fourteenth Amendment, as we shall argue below. 
Alexander Bickel ends his survey of the intentions of the framers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment by blissfully ignoring the words those 
framers wrote into law. 
The Senate Moderates, led by Trumbull and Fessenden. . . . [Believed 
the Amendment] covered the right to contract, sue, give evidence in 
court, and inherit, hold, and dispose of real and personal property; also 
a right to equal protection in the literal sense of benefiting equally from 
laws . . . permitting ownership of firearms, and to equality in the 
penalties and burdens provided by law.66 
Bickel adds: 
Hence one may surmise that the Moderates believed they were 
guaranteeing a right to equal benefits from state educational systems 
supported by general tax funds. But there is no evidence whatever 
showing that for its sponsors the civil rights formula had anything to do 
with unsegregated public schools; Wilson, its sponsor in the House, 
 
RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 62–65 
(2004). Kurt Lash argues in a series of three law review articles, which he is turning into a book, that 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects both against discrimination and enumerated but not 
unenumerated individual rights. Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
Part II: John Bingham and the Second Draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 329 (2011); 
Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I: “Privileges and 
Immunities” as an Antebellum Term of Art, 98 GEO. L.J. 1241 (2010); Kurt T. Lash, The 
Constitutional Referendum of 1866: Andrew Johnson and the Original Meaning of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2128822. 
Robert Natelson argues in The Original Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 43 GA. L. 
REV. 1117 (2009), for the John Harrison and Philip Hamburger interpretation of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. Our own view of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment is that (1) it protects against laws that discriminate on the basis of class 
or caste and that are not just laws enacted for the good of the whole people; and (2) it protects both 
enumerated individual rights and unenumerated individual rights that are deeply rooted in history 
and tradition, subject always to the caveat that the states can override such rights if they pass a just 
law that is enacted for the general good of the whole people. Our reading grows out of the 
foundational case of Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). 
 66. Bickel, supra note 22, at 56. 
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specifically disclaimed any such notion. Similarly, it is plain that the 
Moderates did not intend to confer any right of intermarriage, the right 
to sit on juries, or the right to vote.67 
Intend, intend, intend. Professor Bickel’s overwhelming focus on 
what the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment “intended” prohibits him 
from asking what the words they enacted into law meant in dictionaries 
in common use in 1866. It is to that legal and non-psychological question 
we now turn. 
III. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE RECONSTRUCTION TEXTS 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment completely transforms 
American constitutionalism and federalism. In the first sentence of 
Section 1, all persons born or naturalized in the United States are made 
citizens both of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.68 
In the second sentence of Section 1, citizens are protected from caste- or 
class-creating state laws, and all persons are protected from arbitrary and 
capricious executive and judicial action and from the failure of state 
executives and judges to provide the equal protection of those laws 
already on the books. The exact language of section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment reads as follows: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.69 
It is impossible to overstate the import of this broad language. 
The first sentence of Section 1, like the first sentence of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, overturned the Dred Scott opinion and made all 
persons born in the United States citizens of the United States, including 
African Americans. By raising African Americans up to the level of full 
citizenship, Section 1 made it clear that African Americans in the South 
had the same rights to own guns and engage in free speech as were 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. For a discussion of the citizenship clause, see CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF 
FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS NAMED AND UNNAMED (1997). 
 69. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
1.CALABRESI.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2013  2:56 PM 
1393 Originalism and Loving v. Virginia 
 1413 
enjoyed by the white citizens of whatever southern state they were 
residing in. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV obligates 
the states to give out-of-staters the same privileges and immunities, i.e., 
civil rights, that it gives to its own citizens. In fact, the reason Chief 
Justice Roger B. Taney was so eager to claim that free African 
Americans were not citizens in Dred Scott70 was to allow the southern 
states to disarm them and to censor abolitionist speech.71 
The second sentence of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
the only sentence that is addressed to the “making” and “enforcing” of 
laws. It provides that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States.”72 What are the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States? It is obvious from the first sentence of Section 1 that citizens of 
the United States enjoy privileges or immunities of national citizenship 
and also privileges and immunities of citizenship in the State wherein 
they reside. We know at a bare minimum that Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act of 1866. That means 
that Section 1 somehow constitutionally protects the rights to 
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to 
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal 
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for 
the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and 
shall be subject to like punishment[s] . . . .73 
How does Section 1 accomplish this goal? It protects the common 
law rights of state citizenship, which are privileges or immunities that no 
state can abridge. Section 1 and the history recounted above make it clear 
that the conclusion in The Slaughter-House Cases that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause protects only privileges or immunities of national 
citizenship is absurd. If The Slaughter-House Cases were right, the 
Fourteenth Amendment would have failed to accomplish its prime goal. 
The text of Section 1, and the history recounted so far, make it absolutely 
clear that Section 1 protects state as well as national privileges or 
immunities of citizenship. 
 
 70. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856). 
 71. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 237–38, 
263 (1998). 
 72. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 73. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27. 
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What then did the words “privileges” and “immunities” originally 
mean in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified? Noah 
Webster’s 1828 Dictionary of the English Language defined the word 
“privilege” as follows: 
[Fr. from L. privilegium; privus, separate, private, and lex, law; 
originally a private law, some public act that regarded an individual.] 
1. A particular and peculiar benefit or advantage enjoyed by a person, 
company or society, beyond the common advantages of other citizens. 
A privilege may be a particular right granted by law or held by custom, 
or it may be an exemption from some burden to which others are 
subject. The nobles of Great Britain have the privilege of being triable 
by their peers only. Members of parliament and of our legislatures have 
the privilege of exemption from arrests in certain cases. The powers of 
a banking company are privileges granted by the legislature. 
He pleads the legal privilege of a Roman. Kettlewell. 
The privilege of birthright was a double portion. Locke. 
2. Any peculiar benefit or advantage, right or immunity, not common to 
others of the human race. Thus we speak of national privileges, and 
civil and political privileges, which we enjoy above other nations. We 
have ecclesiastical and religious privileges secured to us by our 
constitutions of government. Personal privileges are attached to the 
person; as those of embassadors, peers, members of legislatures, &c. 
Real privileges are attached to place; as the privileges of the king’s 
palace in England. 
3. Advantage; favor; benefit. 
A nation despicable by its weakness, forfeits even the privilege of 
being neutral. Federalist, Hamilton. 
Writ of privilege, is a writ to deliver a privileged person from custody 
when arrested in a civil suit. Blackstone.74 
Several things are made clear by this dictionary definition. First, the 
word “privilege” refers not to the natural and inalienable rights 
mentioned by Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence but 
instead to positive law entitlements of particular individuals. The right to 
make or enforce contracts or the right to sue are “privileges” but the right 
to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” is not. The rights protected 
 
 74. 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 43 (Rosalie 
J. Slater, ed., Found. Am. Christian Educ., 5th  ed. 1987) (1828). 
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by the word “privilege” in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment are 
positive law rights not natural law rights. 
This same conclusion is also reached when we consider the original 
public meaning of the word “immunities.” Webster’s 1828 dictionary 
defines “immunity” as meaning: 
[Fr. immunité; L. immunitas, from immunis, free, exempt; in and 
munus, charge, office, duty.] 
1. Freedom or exemption from obligation. To be exempted from 
observing the rights or duties of the church, is an immunity. 
2. Exemption from any charge, duty, office, tax or imposition; a 
particular privilege; as the immunities of the free cities of Germany; the 
immunities of the clergy. 
3. Freedom; as an immunity from error. Dryden.75 
Once again, the original meaning connotes positive law rights and 
not natural law rights. The privileges or immunities of federal and of 
state citizenship are thus to be found in positive law and not in the 
writings of John Locke or of other natural law philosophers. This is 
confirmed if we examine the etymology of the words “privilege”76 and 
“immunity.”77 
 What sources would an objective reader of American English have 
turned to in 1868 to figure out what were the positive law privileges or 
immunities of state citizenship? The conclusion is inescapable that such a 
reader would have looked at the body of rights that Article IV, Section 2 
calls “privileges and immunities” and that are protected rights of out-of-
 
 75. 1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 105 
(Rosalie J. Slater, ed., Found. Am. Christian Educ., 5th  ed. 1987) (1828). 
 76. See THE BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 841 (Robert K. Barnhart, ed., 1988) 
[hereinafter BARNHART DICTIONARY] (describing the etymology of “privilege” as follows: “n. 1137 
privilegie a grant, commission, license, in Peterborough Chronicle; later privilege a distinction, 
power (probably before 1200, in Ancrene Riwle), and a special right, advantage, or favor (1340, in 
Ayenbite of Inwyt); borrowed from Old French privilege, learned borrowing from Latin, and 
borrowed directly from Latin privilegium law applying to one individual, (later) privilege, 
prerogative (privus individual; see PRIVATE + lex genitive leges law; see LEGAL). It is probable 
that the early borrowing in Peterborough Chronicle was directly from Latin privilegium.”). 
 77. Id at 510 (describing the etymology of “immunity” as follows: “n. About 1384 ynmunite 
exemption from taxation, service, laws, etc., freedom from prosecution, in the Wycliffe Bible; 
borrowed probably from Old French immunite, and directly from Latin immunitatem (nominative 
immunitas) exemption from performing public service or charges, from immunis exempt from a 
service or charge, exempt, free (im- not, variant of in- before m +munis performing services; see 
COMMON); for suffix see -ITY. . . ”). 
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state residents in a state, which may wish to discriminate against such 
out-of-staters. Article IV, Section 2 allows a state to deny out-of-staters 
political rights like the right to vote or to serve on a jury, but it does not 
allow a state to deny out-of-staters the benefit of state common law or of 
state constitutional or statutory provisions conferring civil rights on state 
citizens.78 Thus, under Article IV, Section 2, the rights “to make and 
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, 
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to 
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of 
person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens”79 are all privileges 
and immunities of state citizenship as to which the states cannot 
discriminate against out-of-staters. These common-law rights are 
therefore also Fourteenth Amendment “privileges or immunities,” which 
no state can “abridge” while “making” or “enforcing” any law. The word 
“abridge” in 1868 meant: 
1. To make shorter; to epitomize; to contract by using fewer words, yet 
retaining the sense in substance – used or writings. . . . 
2. To lessen; to diminish; as to abridge labor; to abridge power or 
rights. . . . 
3. To deprive; to cut off from; followed by of; as to abridge one of his 
rights, or enjoyments. To abridge from, is now obsolete or improper.80  
The Black Codes “abridged” the contractual freedom, or privilege, of 
African Americans by giving African Americans a lesser and diminished 
set of contractual freedoms than were enjoyed by white citizens. This 
understanding of “abridge” is also confirmed when we examine the 
etymology of the word.81 This is why the Fourteenth Amendment 
constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and forever rendered the 
Black Codes unconstitutional. 
The second sentence of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment also 
includes a Due Process Clause and an Equal Protection Clause that were 
originally meant to play a subsidiary role relative to the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause which was all important. The Due Process Clause 
protected life, liberty, and property from arbitrary and capricious 
 
 78. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
 79. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). 
 80. WEBSTER, supra note 75. 
 81. BARNHART DICTIONARY, supra note 76, at 4 (describing the etymology of “abridge” as 
follows: “v. About 1303 abregen curtail, lessen, borrowed from Old French abregier or abreger, 
from Late Latin abbreviare make brief. . . . The sense “to make shorter, condense” appeared about 
1384 in the Wycliffe Bible.”). 
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executive or judicial action, but it was not originally meant to restrain the 
power of state legislatures to make laws. The Equal Protection Clause 
forbade state executives from giving white Americans the protection of 
laws against violence while denying “equal protection” to African 
Americans.82 The noun in the Equal Protection Clause is protection not 
equal, and it is the protection of the laws that the Clause is all about. 
After eviscerating the Privileges or Immunities Clause in The 
Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court settled on the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the Clause that substantively 
protected individual rights from state legislative infringement, and it 
located the Fourteenth Amendment’s anti-discrimination command in the 
Equal Protection Clause.83 None of this makes the least bit of sense as an 
original matter,84 but the expansive mistaken meanings of the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses effectively undo much of the 
damage caused by the evisceration of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause in The Slaughter-House Cases. We only mention this history here 
because we are trying to offer an originalist defense of Loving v. Virginia 
and doing that requires that we apply the Constitution before The 
Slaughter-House Cases mangled it.85 
So is the right to marry a privilege or immunity of state citizenship as 
to which the states could not constitutionally discriminate in 1868? The 
answer is unquestionably yes. State common law rights in 1868 included 
liberties of contract, rights to hold property, rights to sue for torts, rights 
to testify in court, and rights to inherit among many other rights. The 
right to marry would surely have been thought to be a fundamental and 
longstanding common law right in 1868. 
One way to think about this question is to ask about it in the context 
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. 
Suppose a state allowed its citizens to marry their second cousins but not 
their first cousins or their siblings. Could such a state have denied an out-
 
 82. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 83. The Equal Protection Clause was transformed from a guarantee that all classes would be 
equally protected by state executive officials and by the common law as enforced by state courts into 
an additional guarantee that state legislature would make only equal laws. 
 84. The modern Supreme Court’s construction of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause wrongly implies that a clause about process has a substantive component.  The Court’s 
construction of the Equal Protection Clause overlooks the fact that the noun in the Clause is 
“protection” and not “equal” and that the Clause is therefore addressed to inequalities in the 
administration of the law rather than in the making of it. 
 85. For an apt discussion of Slaughterhouse’s mangling of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, see BLACK, supra note 68. 
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of-stater resident in the state the right to marry his second cousin? The 
answer would be certainly not! The right to marry would have been 
viewed as being a privilege and immunity of state citizenship as to which 
no discrimination against out-of-staters would have been allowed. 
Similarly, the right to marry, which was the subject of Loving v. 
Virginia, would have been described in 1868 as being a privilege or 
immunity that the Fourteenth Amendment protected from abridgement. 
Could a state constitutionally, after 1868, have a Black Marriage Code 
and a White Marriage Code without being guilty of abridging the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States? The answer is 
clearly “no” even though almost no-one realized it at the time. The ban 
on racial intermarriage limited the contractual freedom of African 
Americans in a way related to the way in which the Black Codes limited 
the contractual and common law rights of African Americans. Just as the 
plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment banned the Black Codes so 
too did it ban a racial marriage code. 
The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment does suggest 
that some of the framers of the Amendment may have understood the 
Article IV, Section 2 Privileges and Immunities Clause to be confined to 
only the protection of fundamental rights and that they may also have 
thought that fundamental rights could be trumped where there was a 
compelling governmental interest. Many of the Fourteenth Amendment 
framers, when asked what the phrase “privileges or immunities” meant 
referred to the definition of that phrase given in Justice Bushrod 
Washington’s rambling opinion in Corfield v. Coryell.86 Justice 
Washington said in Corfield: 
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the 
several states? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to 
those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; 
which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and 
which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several 
states which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, 
independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental principles are, it 
would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, 
however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: 
Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with 
the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue 
and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints 
 
 86. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). 
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as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the 
whole.87 
Is the right to marry a fundamental right which, in Justice 
Washington’s words has “at all times been enjoyed by the citizens of the 
several states which compose this Union, from the time of their 
becoming free, independent, and sovereign?”88 The answer is obviously 
yes. The right to marry is clearly a fundamental right or, as we would say 
today, it is a right that is deeply rooted in history and tradition.89 
A closer question may be raised if we ask whether the right to racial 
intermarriage is “subject nevertheless to such restraints as the 
government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.”90 
We do think some restrictions on the right to marry are “just” and are for 
“the general good of the whole” which is why we have incest laws and 
polygamy laws, which do after all limit the right to marry. Is a law that 
forbids racial intermarriage a “just” law enacted for “the general good of 
the whole” against the backdrop of a constitutional amendment that was 
billed as ending the nation’s racial caste system? It is hard to see how the 
answer to that question could be “yes” given that most systems of caste 
are kept in place by bans on intermarriage. Obviously, many of the 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought that the government had a 
compelling governmental interest in preventing racial intermarriage, but 
it is just as obvious that it was the ban on racial intermarriage which lay 
at the bottom of the very racial caste system that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was written to extirpate. 
Recent scholarship by Philip Hamburger has revealed that Justice 
Washington’s opinion in Corfield was an activist attempt by a southern 
judge to limit Article IV, Section 2 privileges and immunities so as to 
prevent free African Americans in the South from being able to carry 
guns or to speak freely against slavery.91 The Reconstruction framers 
who trotted out Corfield in the legislative history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment may thus have been relying on erroneous dicta in a faulty 
precedent. There is, moreover, no reason to suppose that the American 
people generally understood the phrase privileges or immunities in 1868 
the way Justice Washington had understood it. To the contrary, most 
 
 87. Id at 551–52. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Calabresi, supra note 65, at 1517, 1533–34. 
 90. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551–52. 
 91. See Hamburger, supra note 65, at 93–96. 
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Americans who could read the Constitution would have analogized the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV—without Justice 
Washington’s obscure gloss. The right to marry was a privilege or 
immunity in 1868 as to which the government could not discriminate on 
the basis of race. Loving v. Virginia was thus rightly decided based on 
the original meaning of the text of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
But suppose we follow Raoul Berger and Alexander Bickel and deny 
that the phrase “privileges or immunities” was anything more than code 
for the rights enumerated in the Civil Rights Act of 1868? Suppose we 
claim against all the evidence of original meaning set forth above that the 
only fundamental rights as to which racial discrimination is prohibited 
are the rights “to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give 
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and 
personal property.”92 Do laws banning racial intermarriage “abridge” or 
shorten or lessen the literal right of African Americans and white 
Americans “to make and enforce contracts?” The answer is obviously 
yes. If an African American man is told that he can legally enter into a 
marriage contract with only an African American woman and not a white 
woman then it is obvious that his ability to make marriage contracts has 
been abridged. A marriage contract is a contract and just as the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 protected the contractual rights of African Americans 
in the workplace so too did its literal language protect contract rights in 
family law as well. 
Alexander Bickel may have been right that the Framers of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 did not understand that Act to ban anti-
miscegenation laws, but maybe the Framers of the Act were simply 
wrong about what it said or maybe some of them secretly thought the 
Act banned anti-miscegenation laws but thought it impolitic to say so 
publically. After the general civil rights language was amended out of 
the 1866 Act, Rep. Wilson said: Mr. Speaker, the amendment which 
has just been read proposes to strike out the general terms relating to 
civil rights. I do not think it materially changes the bill . . .93 
Let us return to the language of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, this 
time armed with dictionaries, and ask whether laws against racial 
 
 92. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 
242 (2012) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (2000)). 
 93. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1366 (1866) (emphasis added). 
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intermarriage violated not only the Fourteenth Amendment but also the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 as well. 
The full and final text of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is reproduced 
below with critical language highlighted in italics. The Act says: 
April 9, 1866 
An Act to protect all Persons in the United States in their Civil Rights, 
and furnish the Means of their Vindication. 
 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, That all persons born 
in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding 
Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United 
States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any 
previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, 
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United 
States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give 
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and 
personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by 
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and 
penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or 
custom, to the contrary notwithstanding. 
 SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That any person who, under color 
of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, shall subject, or 
cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State or Territory to the 
deprivation of any right secured or protected by this act, or to different 
punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such person having at any 
time been held in a condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, 
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been 
duly convicted, or by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for 
the punishment of white persons, shall be deemed guilty of a 
misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be punished by fine not 
exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding one 
year, or both, in the discretion of the court.94 
To summarize succinctly, the Act says that “citizens, of every race 
and color . . . shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in 
the United States, to make and enforce contracts . . . and to full and 
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and 
 
 94. Civil Rights Act of 1866, §§ 1-2 (emphasis added) (italics omitted). 
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property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.”95 Let us repeat, again, for 
emphasis what we just said: Citizens of every race and color shall have 
the same right to make contracts as is enjoyed by white citizens. If a 
white citizen can contract to marry another white citizen, then it follows 
a fortiori that citizens of every race and color “shall have the same 
right.”96 This may well be a legal outcome that the framers of the 1866 
Act did not “intend,” but it is an outcome that they legislated. We do not 
know or care whether the framers of the Civil Rights Act were fools, 
knaves, or crafty abolitionists. All we know is what the Act says. 
Consider the dictionary definitions of such key words in the 1866 
Act as “same,” “full,” and “equal.” The original public meaning of these 
words all supports our conclusion that bans on racial intermarriage 
violated the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 
A. Same 
The word “same” today means an equality or exact likeness of 
characteristics.97 An examination of multiple dictionaries resources from 
1828 to 1866 shows not only that in 1866 the word “same” was 
understood to mean precisely what it means today but also that the 
meaning of the word had remained consistent in the nearly four decades 
leading up to the passage of the Civil Rights Act. Noah Webster’s 
authoritative 1828 Dictionary of the English Language defines the term 
“same” as meaning: “1. Identical; not different or other. . . . 2. Of the 
identical kind or species, though not the specific thing. . . . 3. That was 
mentioned before. . . . 4. Equal; exactly similar.”98 These definitions are 
remarkably consistent with the current understanding of the word 
“same,” though they are more than a century old. Same means 
“identical,” “equal,” or “exactly similar.”99 African Americans must 
have the identical right to enter into marriage contracts as is enjoyed by 
white citizens. If a white citizen could contract to marry a white citizen, 
then according to the plain words of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 African 
Americans must have the identical right. 
 
 95. Id. (emphasis added). 
 96. Id. 
 97. WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, DELUXE 1602 (2d ed. 1983). 
 98. WEBSTER, supra note 75. 
 99. Id. 
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The authority of Noah Webster’s dictionary in the nineteenth century 
is beyond question.100 While more could usefully be written about the 
history of dictionaries and their use, it is clear that in the field of 
American English, Webster’s dictionary is dominant and has been since 
the first edition in 1828.101 Indeed, Webster’s dictionary remains in 
widespread use even today. Webster’s first dictionary, the 1828 edition 
we have cited above, was published in two volumes containing 70,000 
words, and it included 40,000 more definitions than had ever been 
published before in an English dictionary.102 Subsequent editions 
followed in 1840, and after Webster’s death in 1843, another edition was 
published in 1864.103 Webster’s 1828 dictionary was an incredible 
achievement, and one that took twenty years to finish.104 Webster had 
already established a reputation as an author of grammar and spelling 
readers—his Grammatical Institute of the English Language, 
colloquially known as Webster’s Spelling Book, was estimated to have 
sold over sixty-two million copies by 1889.105 
One concern that a reader might have with our reliance here on 
Webster’s 1828 dictionary is the possibility of an evolution in the 
meaning of the language over time. The forty year passage of time from 
the publication of Webster’s first dictionary in 1828 to the time of 
Reconstruction in 1868 is cause enough for concern, but combined with 
the social upheaval of the Civil War, it might not be a surprise to find 
that definitions of key terms changed between 1828 and 1868. But the 
evidence does not bear out this possibility. Webster’s 1840 dictionary 
offers the exact same definition of same as did his 1828 dictionary: 
“identical, not different or other.”106 Finally, Webster’s 1865 dictionary 
also defines “same” as: “1. Not different or other; identical. 2. Of like 
kind, species, sort, dimensions, or the like; not differing in character or in 
the quality or qualities compared; corresponding; not discordant; similar; 
like.”107 Clearly, the definition of the word “same” did not change in 
meaning from 1828 to 1865, and it is not different at all from the 
 
 100. HISTORY OF THE DICTIONARY (Christopher Wortzenspeigel ed., 2011) 
 101. Id. 
 102. Joshua Lawrence Eason, Dictionary-Making in the English Language, 5 PEABODY J. 
EDUC., 347, 352 (1928). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 351. 
 106. NOAH WEBSTER, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (19th ed. 1840). 
 107. NOAH WEBSTER ET AL., A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1865). 
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definition of the word “same” today. The etymology of the word “same” 
suggests as well that its meaning has been constant for centuries.108 
It follows that items described in 1866 as being the “same” were 
expected to be identical, and not different in character or quality. In 
1866, to say that two groups of people had “the same right” was 
understood to have meant identical, not different, and equivalent rights. 
The usage of the phrase “the same right” in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
thus recognizes no difference whatsoever between the contractual rights 
afforded to citizens of every race and color and white citizens. If a white 
citizen could enter into a marriage contract with another white citizen in 
1866, then so could citizens of all other races and colors. 
B. Full 
The second operative phrase in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, “full 
and equal benefit” appears in the following language: “citizens, of every 
race and color . . . shall have the same right, in every State and Territory 
in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, . . . and to full and 
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and 
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.”109 One key question is what do 
the words “full” and “equal” mean here as a matter of original public 
meaning in 1866. Webster’s authoritative 1828 dictionary defines the 
word “full” as meaning: 
1. Replete; having within its limits all that it can contain; as a vessel 
full of liquor. 2. Abounding with; having a large quantity or abundance; 
as a house full of furniture; life is full of cares and perplexities. 3. 
Supplied; not vacant. . . . 4. Plump; fat; as a full body. 5. Saturated; 
sated. . . . 6. Crowded, with regard to the imagination or memory. . . . 7. 
Large; entire; not partial; that fills; as a full meal. 8. Complete; entire; 
not defective or partial; as the full accomplishment of a prophecy. 9. 
 
 108. Barnhart describes the etymology of “same” as follows: 
adj. Probably about 1200, in The Ormulum; probably abstracted from the adverbial use in 
Old English swā same the same as, likewise, in part by influence of Scandinavian use 
(compare Old Icelandic samr, same, sama same); cognate with Old Saxon so sama the 
same, Old High German and Gothic sama same, from Proto-Germanic samōn. Cognates 
outside Germanic include Old Irish samail likeness, Latin similis like, simul together, at 
the same time, Greek homós same, heîs, hén one, háma together, Lithuanian sam-, sa- 
with, Old Slavic so- with, samŭ one, and Sanskrit samá-s level, equal, same, -samá-m 
together, from Indo-European sem-/som-/sm- (Pok.902). 
BARNHART DICTIONARY, supra note 76, at 954. 
 109. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (emphasis added) (current 
version at 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982). 
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Complete; entire; without abatement. . . . 10. Containing the whole 
matter; expressing the whole; as a full narration or description. 11. 
Strong; not faint or attenuated; loud; clear; distinct; as a full voice or 
sound. 12. Mature; perfect; as a person of full age. 13. Entire; complete; 
denoting the completion of a sentence; as a full stop or point. 14. 
Spread to view in all dimensions; as a head drawn with a full face. . . . 
15. Exhibiting the whole disk or surface illuminated; as the full moon. 
16. Abundant; plenteous; sufficient. We have a full supply of 
provisions for the year. 17. Adequate; equal; as a full compensation or 
reward for labor. 18. Well fed. 19. Well supplied or furnished; 
abounding. 20. Copious; ample. The speaker or the writer was full upon 
that point.110 
All of these definitions suggest that the word “full” had the exact 
same public meaning in 1828 that it does today. For citizens of every 
race and color to have the “full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings” as was enjoyed by white citizens would require that they 
have exactly the same rights. It would require that if white citizens could 
enter into marriage contracts with white citizens then citizens of every 
race and color must also have the same contractual right. 
As with the word “same,” subsequent dictionary definitions of “full” 
suggest that the meaning of the word did not change between 1828 and 
1866. An 1840 dictionary thus defined the term “full” as: “a. having all it 
can contain, satisfied. n. complete measure, or state. ad. fully, quite, 
without abatement.”111 An 1862 dictionary offered a similar lengthy 
definition of “full” which we have reproduced in the margins.112 All of 
 
 110. WEBSTER, supra note 75. 
 111. Id. 
 112. NOAH WEBSTER ET AL., A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1862). The 1862 
dictionary defines “full” as: 
Adjective: 1. Replete; having within its limits all that it can contain; as, a vessel full of 
liquor. 2. Abounding with; having a large quantity or abundance; as, a house full of 
furniture; life is full of cares and perplexities. 3. Supplied; not vacant. 4. Plump; fat; as, a 
full body. 5. Saturated; sated. 6. Crowded, with regard to the imagination or memory. 7. 
Large; entire; not partial; that fills; as, a full meal 8. Complete; entire; not defective or 
partial; as, the full accomplishment of a prophecy. 9. Complete; entire; without 
abatement. . .10 Containing the whole matter; expressing the whole; as, a full narration or 
description. 11. Strong; not faint or attenuated; loud; clear; distinct; as, a full voice or 
sound. 12. Mature; perfect; as, a person of full age. 13. Entire; complete; denoting the 
completion of a sentence; as, a full stop or point. 14. Spread to view in all dimensions; as, 
a head drawn with a full face. . .15. Exhibiting the whole disk or surface illuminated; as, 
the full moon. 16. Abundant; plenteous; sufficient. We have a full supply of provisions 
for the year. 17. Adequate; equal; as, a full compensation or reward for labor. 18. Well 
fed. 19. Well supplied or furnished; abounding. 20. Copious; ample. Noun: 1. Complete 
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these definitions are consistent with the modern meaning of “full.” 
Finally, yet another edition of Webster’s, issued in 1864, defined “full” 
as: 
Adjective: 1. Filled up; having within its limits all that it can contain; 
supplied; not empty or vacant;—said primarily of hollow vessels, and 
hence, of any thing else as, a cup full of water; a house full of people. 2. 
Abundantly furnished or provided; sufficient in quantity, quality, or 
degree; copious; ample; adequate; as, a full meal; a full supply; a full 
voice; a full compensation. 3. Amply provided or furnished; abounding 
in; well laden with;—often with of; as, a house full of furniture, and the 
like. 4. Not wanting in any essential quality; complete; entire; perfect; 
adequate; as, a full narrative; a person of full age; a full stop; a full face; 
the full moon.113 
In sum, there was absolutely no change whatsoever in the meaning 
of the word “full” between 1828 and 1866. In fact, the etymology of the 
word “full” suggests its meaning had been constant for centuries.114 
 
measure; utmost extent. This instrument answers to the full. 2. The highest state or 
degree. 3. The state of satiety; as, fed to the full. The full of the moon, is the time when it 
presents to the spectator its whole face illuminated, as it always does when in opposition 
to the sun. Adverb: 1. Quite, to the same degree; without abatement or diminution. 2. 
With the whole effect. 3. Exactly. 4. Directly; as, he looked him full in the face. It is 
placed before adjectives and adverbs to heighten or strengthen their signification; as, full 
sad. Full is prefix to other words, chiefly participles, to express utmost extent or degree. 
 113. NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Chauncey A. 
Goodrich & Noah Porter, eds., Mass., G. & C. Merriam Co. 1864). Additional meanings of full in 
this dictionary included: 
5. —Full and by (Naut.), sailing close-hauled, having all the sails full, and lying as near 
the wind as possible.—Totten. 6. Full band (Mus.), a band in which all the voices and 
instruments are employed 7. –Full moon, the moon with its whole disk illuminated, s 
when opposite to the sun; also, the time when the moon is full. 8. Full organ (Mus.), an 
organ in which all or most of the stops are out. Noun: 1. Complete measure; utmost 
extent; the highest state or degree. Adverb: 1. Quite; to the same degree; without 
abatement or diminution; with full force or effect; completely; exactly; entirely. 2. Full is 
prefixed to other words, chiefly participles, to express utmost extent or degree; as, full-
bloomed, full-blown, full-crammed, full-grown, full-laden, full-stuffed, and others. Such 
compounds are self-defining. Verb intransitive: 1. To become full or wholly illuminated; 
as, the moon fulls at midnight. 
 114. Barnhart offers the following etymology of the word “full”: 
adj. Old English full complete, full (917, in the Anglo-Saxon Chronical); cognate with 
Old Frisian full, foll full, Old Saxon full, Dutch vol, Old High German fol (modern 
German voll), Old Icelandic fullr, and Gothic fulls, from Proto-Germanic *fullaz, earlier 
*fulnaz. Outside Germanic cognates are found in Latin plēnus full, plēre to fill, Greek 
plḗrēs full, plḗthein to be full, Albanian plot full, Old Irish lān full, Old Welsh laun, 
Welsh llawn, Armenian li, Lithuanian pìlnas, Old Slavic plŭnŭ and Sanskrit pūrná-s full, 
from Indo-European *pḹnós, root *pelǝ- . . . . Much of the relationship among the 
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C. Equal 
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 uses the word “full” in tandem with the 
word “equal” in the following phrase: 
[C]itizens, of every race and color . . . shall have the same right, in 
every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce 
contracts . . . and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings 
for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white 
citizens.115 
The meaning of the word “equal” is particularly important for the 
purposes of our inquiry. As we will subsequently show, the word “equal” 
was used frequently in public discourse concerning the Civil Rights Act. 
Achieving an understanding of the word “equal” is thus necessary to 
developing an understanding of the original public meaning of the Act. 
Noah Webster’s landmark 1828 Dictionary of the English language 
defines the word “equal” as meaning: 
1. Having the same magnitude or dimensions; being of the same bulk or 
extent; as an equal quantity of land; a house of equal size; two persons 
of equal bulk; an equal line or angle. 2. Having the same value; as two 
commodities of equal price or worth. 3. Having the same qualities or 
condition; as two men of equal rank or excellence; two bodies of equal 
hardness or softness. 4. Having the same degree; as two motions of 
equal velocity. 5. Even; uniform; not variable; as an equal temper or 
mind. . . . 6. Being in just proportion; as, my commendation is not 
equal to his merit. 7. Impartial; neutral; not biased. . . . 8. Indifferent; of 
the same interest or concern. He may receive them or not, it is equal to 
me. 9. Just; equitable; giving the same or similar rights or advantages. 
The terms and conditions of the contract are equal. 10. Being on the 
same terms; enjoying the same or similar benefits. . . .11. Adequate; 
having competent power, ability or means. The ship is not equal to her 
 
cognates can be obtained from the reconstructed Indo-European form *pḹnós, as in Old 
Welsh and Old Irish, which show the usual Celtic loss of Indo-European p that is found 
independently in Armenian, and also independently in Sanskrit r (in pūrṇá-s), which 
represents l. The ll in the Germanic words is from –ln- (compare Lithuanian pìlnas) and 
is a continuation of an Indo-European adjective with the -n suffix. More immediately of 
note is that among the so-called West Germanic languages the o (as in Old High German 
fol) is represented by Old English u. 
BARNHART DICTIONARY, supra note 76, at 413. 
 115. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, § 1 (1866) (emphasis added) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982). 
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antagonist. The army was not equal to the contest. We are not equal to 
the undertaking.116 
This clearly suggests that equal is a synonym for the word “same” 
and that “equal rights” are therefore “the same rights.” This 
understanding persists in the 1840 edition of Webster’s in which the term 
“equal” was defined as: “Adjective: like in amount or degree, even, just. 
Noun: one of the same rank or age. Verb transitive or intransitive: to 
make equal, to be equal.”117 In an 1862 edition of Webster’s, the term 
equal was defined as: 
Adjective: 1. Having the same magnitude or dimensions; being of the 
same bulk or extent; as, an equal quantity of land; a house of equal 
size; two persons of equal bulk; an equal line or angle. 2. Having the 
same value; as, two commodities of equal price or worth. 3. Having the 
same qualities or condition; as, two men of equal rank of excellence; 
two bodies of equal hardness or softness.118 
Again, there is no shift in meaning. Finally, in the 1864 edition of 
Webster’s, “equal” is defined as: “Adjective: 1. Not disagreeing in 
quantity, degree, value, or the like; having the same magnitude, 
dimensions, the same value, the same degree, or the like; neither inferior 
nor superior, greater nor less, better nor worse; corresponding; alike; as, . 
. . persons of equal stature or talents; commodities of equal value.”119 
 
 116. NOAH WEBSTER, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, (5th ed., Found. Am. 
Christian Educ., 1828). 
 117. NOAH WEBSTER, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE ABRIDGED FROM THE 
AMERICAN DICTIONARY, FOR THE USE OF PRIMARY SCHOOLS AND THE COUNTING HOUSE 151 
(N.Y., F.J. Huntington & Co., 19th ed. 1840). 
 118. WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 112. Additional meanings of equal in this dictionary include: 
4. Having the same degree; as, two motions of equal velocity. 5. Even; uniform; not 
variable; as, an equal temper or mind. 6. Being in just proportion; as, my commendation 
is not equal to his merit. 7. Impartial; neutral; not biased. 8. Indifferent; of the same 
interest of concern. He may receive them or not, it is equal to me. 9. Just; equitable; 
giving the same or similar rights or advantages. The terms and conditions of the contract 
are equal. 10. Being on the same terms; enjoying the same or similar benefits. 1. 
Adequate; having competent power, ability, or means. The ship is not equal to the 
contest. We are not equal to the undertaking. Noun: 1. One not inferior or superior to 
another; having the same or a similar age, rank, station, office, talents, strength, &c. Verb 
transitive: 1. To make equal; to make one thing of the same quantity, dimensions, or 
quality as another. 2. To rise to the same state, rank, or estimation with another; to 
become equal to. Few officers can expect to equal Washington in fame. 3. To be equal to. 
4. To make equivalent to; to recompense fully; to answer in full proportion. 5. To be of 
like excellence or beauty. 
 119. WEBSTER, supra note 113, at 458. Additional definitions of “equal” in this dictionary 
include: 
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There is thus no change at all in the meaning of the word “equal” from 
1828 to 1866 on down to the present day. Indeed, the etymology of the 
word “equal” suggests that the meaning of the word has not changed in 
many centuries.120 The “full and equal benefits” promised by the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 are quite literally the same, identical benefits as are 
enjoyed by white citizens. If white citizens could contract to marry 
another white citizen then citizens of every race and color have the 
identical, same right. 
One question that readers may wonder about at this point is whether 
Plessy v. Ferguson121 was correctly decided, in 1896, when it upheld a 
Louisiana law mandating racial segregation in railway cars122 Homer 
Plessy, who despite being one-eighth African descent was designated as 
being black by Louisiana law, was arrested for sitting in the whites only 
car on a train and for refusing to move to the car designated for African 
 
2. Bearing a suitable relation; of just proportion; having competent power, abilities, or 
means; adequate; fit; as, he is not equal to the task. 3. Evenly balanced; not unduly 
inclining to either side; dictated or characterized by fairness; unbiased; just; equitable. 4. 
Of the same interest or concern; indifferent. [They who are not disposed to receive them 
may let them alone or reject them; it is equal to me.] 5. (Mus.) Intended for voices of one 
kind only; —said of a composition in performing which the voices are either all male or 
all female. [Rare] 6. Syn.—Even; equable; uniform; adequate; proportionate; 
commensurate; fair just; equitable. Noun: 1. One not inferior or superior to another; one 
having the same or a similar age, rank, station, office, talents, strength, or other quality or 
condition; an equal quantity. Verb transitive: 1. To be or become equal to; to have the 
same quantity, or value, or degree, or rank, or the like, with; to be commensurate with. 2. 
To make equal return to; to recompense fully. 3. To make equal or equal to; to cause to 
be commensurate with or unsurpassed by; to equalize; hence, to compare or regard as 
equals. 
Id. at 458–59. 
 120. Barnhart offers the following etymology of “equal”: 
adj. About 1390, in Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales; borrowed from Latin aequālis uniform, 
identical, equal, from aequus level, even, just, of uncertain origin . . . . A parallel form 
egal equal, equivalent (obsolete in English since the 1650’s) was widely used in Middle 
English, first recorded in 1380, in Chaucer’s translation of Boethius’ De Consolatione 
Philosophiae, and borrowed from Old French egal, igal, from Latin aequālis. Its 
derivative in French égalité (earlier borrowed into Middle English, 1380, in Chaucer’s 
translation of Beothius’ De Consolatione Philosophiae, but becoming obsolete by 1650) 
and thence égalitare was used with the suffix -ian to form egalitarian in English. French 
égalité had also been borrowed into English (Middle English egalyte, in Chaucer’s 
Boethius, 1380), but it, too, became obsolete by 1650, until apparently re-formed by 
Tennyson, in 1864. 
BARNHART DICTIONARY, supra note 76, at 337. 
 121. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 122. Id. at 537–38. 
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Americans.123 Plessy argued the Louisiana law segregating railway cars 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equality.124 By a vote 
of seven to one, the Supreme Court held that laws providing for separate 
but equal public facilities and accommodations for the races were 
constitutional.125 Justice Harlan dissented, powerfully arguing that the 
Constitution was colorblind and neither knew nor tolerated any systems 
of caste.126 
The Louisiana law upheld in Plessy was in blatant violation of both 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. It did not give African Americans the same right to make 
contracts as was enjoyed by white citizens. Under the Louisiana law, a 
white citizen could contract to ride in the whites-only railway car, but an 
African American citizen could not make the same contract. The 
Louisiana railway car segregation law directly impeded the contractual 
and economic liberty of African Americans much as the Black Codes 
had done thirty years before. The Black Codes were overturned by the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and by the Fourteenth Amendment in 
significant part to ensure that African Americans would have the same 
liberty of contract as was enjoyed by white citizens. Jim Crow 
segregation impaired that liberty of contract and was thus blatantly 
unconstitutional. The Plessy majority evidently thought that it was 
somehow possible for the Fourteenth Amendment to ban the Black 
Codes while allowing for Jim Crow segregation. This is plainly not the 
case. Both the Black Codes and Jim Crow limited the liberty of contract 
of African Americans as compared to white Americans, and they were 
therefore both unconstitutional for the same reason. There is no 
“daylight” between the Black Codes and Jim Crow such that the 
Fourteenth Amendment could somehow ban the one without also 
banning the other. Plessy v. Ferguson was thus wrong on the day it was 
decided in 1896. 
We have now shown that whatever the intent was of the 39th 
Congress when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the semantic meaning of those enactments 
clearly forbade both anti-miscegenation laws and Jim Crow segregation. 
The Reconstruction legislators passed laws that were far more sweeping 
 
 123. Id. at 538–39. 
 124. Id. at 542. 
 125. Id. at 552. 
 126. Id. at 552–64 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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than many members of Congress may have realized at the time. We now 
turn to the public discussion of these texts in prominent newspapers in 
major cities at the time the texts were enacted. This discussion shows 
that many citizens appreciated the sweeping nature of the enactments in 
question. The original public meaning of the Reconstruction texts as it is 
revealed in the newspaper debates is quite consistent with the semantic 
dictionary meaning we have just discussed in the material above. 
IV. PUBLIC PERCEPTION 
It is clear to a student of the history of Reconstruction that at the end 
of the Civil War the nation found itself in the largest societal experiment 
since the Founding. The rebuilding and integration of the northern and 
southern states presented gargantuan social, political, and economic 
challenges. The status of newly freed slaves and their integration into, or 
the creation of, slave-less societies in the South and elsewhere was just 
one set of issues presented at the end of the Civil War. The fate of the 
freed men and women in the South represented a moral challenge to the 
nation. Reconstruction began hopefully under President Abraham 
Lincoln only to devolve into President Andrew Johnson’s fraught and 
accommodating treatment of southern states, which led ultimately to the 
passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The proponents of 
equal rights for the freed slaves began by arguing for equal common law 
rights, they moved to arguing for equality in civil rights, and they ended 
Reconstruction favoring equal political rights127 and opposing school 
segregation.128 The opponents of equal rights for the freed slaves made 
their opposition clear first with the passage of the Black Codes and later 
with the passage of Jim Crow laws. The end result was a gradual (and 
shamefully slow) broadening of the classes and content of rights 
available to African Americans. Though it took more than a century to 
accomplish what should have been done immediately the end of the Civil 
War, the question we address here is exactly when full equality as to civil 
rights was mandated by the letter of the law. 
The history of Reconstruction shows that there was no consensus 
about the scope and substance of rights for African Americans in 1865, 
even among elected Republicans and New England abolitionists.129 
While the content of the rights properly afforded to freedmen was 
 
 127. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 128. See McConnell, supra note 8, at 1093–1100. 
 129. See FONER, supra note 53. 
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debated throughout Reconstruction, there was a steady movement 
between 1865 and 1877 toward greater protection of the rights of African 
Americans. This is shown most dramatically by the adoption of the 
Fifteenth Amendment giving African American men the right to vote in 
1870 when a mere four years earlier the Congress that had passed the 
Fourteenth Amendment was opposed to voting rights for African 
Americans. Indeed, while in 1870 the expansion of suffrage to freedmen 
was passed with constitutional supermajorities in Congress and the 
ratifying states, measures to extend the franchise in 1865 were met with 
procedural hang-ups in Congress and overwhelming disapproval in the 
popular electorate.130 The process of extending equal rights to African 
Americans began with the common law rights conferred by the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, broadened into the conferral of equal civil rights in 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and culminated with the granting of equal 
political rights in the Fifteenth Amendment. As Senator Lyman Trumbull 
explained in defending the Civil Rights Act: 
But, sir, the granting of civil rights does not, and never did, in this 
country carry with it political privileges. A man may be a citizen in this 
country without a right to vote or without a right to hold office. The 
right to vote and to hold office in the States depends upon the 
legislation of the various States. The right to hold certain offices under 
the federal government depends upon the Constitution of the United 
States . . . . So that the fact of being a citizen does not necessarily 
qualify a person for an office, nor does it necessarily authorize him to 
vote. Women are citizens, children are citizens, but they do not exercise 
the elective franchise by virtue of their citizenship.131 
Thanks to the focus of the Black Codes on limiting the economic 
freedom of African Americans, the first civil rights guaranteed African 
Americans were related to freedom of economic opportunity through 
rights to labor and to make and enforce contracts. In the immediate 
 
 130. In December 1865, a popular referendum was held in the District of Columbia which put 
enfranchisement of the freedmen to a vote. Thirty-five votes were tallied in favor of suffrage, and 
6951 were tallied against it. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 74 app. at 217 (1866); DAVID 
HERBERT DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER 239–41 (1996); FONER, supra note 53, at 240 (citing 
GEORGES CLEMENCEAU, AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION 1865–1870, at 63 (1928)); CONSTANCE 
MCLAUGHLIN GREEN, THE SECRET CITY: A HISTORY OF RACE RELATIONS IN THE NATION’S 
CAPITAL 75–77 (1967); MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL 
REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1863–1869, at 141–46 (1st ed. 1974); HANS L. TREFOUSSE, 
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN WADE: RADICAL REPUBLICAN FROM OHIO 263 (1963). 
 131. Lyman Trumbull in a response to President Johnson’s Veto of the Civil Rights Act. 
Lyman Trumbull (1866) reprinted in BOS. DAILY J., Apr. 6, 1866. 
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months after the end of the Civil War, all eyes were fixed on economic 
freedom, which the freedmen viewed as a necessary component of 
liberty. In the words of radical Republican Benjamin F. Flanders, the 
freedmen were bedeviled by the fact that Democrats devoted “[t]heir 
whole thought and time . . . to plans for getting things back as near to 
slavery as possible.”132 The earliest fights over civil rights thus focused 
on the interrelated rights to labor, freedom of movement, and freedom of 
contract, as unsympathetic state and local governments enacted 
limitations on the forms of employment available to freedmen and strict 
penalties for crimes like vagrancy.133 These laws, the earliest of the 
Black Codes, virtually banned African Americans from working as 
anything but farmers and servants.134 Some of the Black Codes provided 
for sweeping punishments for those who violated them, which could then 
be used to return convicted offenders to a state of servitude.135 An 
example can be found in a code enacted in 1865 by the state of Alabama, 
which defined vagrants as including “a stubborn or refractory servant; a 
laborer or servant who loiters away his time, or refuses to comply with 
any contract for a term of service without just cause” and provided that 
the punishment for vagrancy should not exceed “hard labor, either in or 
out of [a poor-house or house of correction], the use of chain-gangs, 
putting in stocks . . .”136 Under the Black Codes, families were split apart 
(as had happened under slavery) because parents were deemed incapable 
of caring for their children. The children in these cases would then be 
bound to work as unpaid apprentices sometimes for their white former 
slave owners without the consent of the youth’s parents.137 
The actions by southern legislatures to reinvent slavery as a legal 
institution with the Black Codes led directly to the text of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866. We see in the text of the Act a direct response to the 
challenges posed by the Black Codes. The Civil Rights Act’s guarantee 
to African Americans of “the same right[s] . . . as is enjoyed by white 
citizens” “to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give 
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey . . . property” 
 
 132. FONER, supra note 53, at 199 (quoting Letter from Benjamin F. Flanders to Henry C. 
Warmoth, (Nov. 23, 1865), in WARMOTH PAPERS). 
 133. Id. at 198–203. 
 134. Id. at 200. 
 135. ALABAMA BLACK CODES, NO. 112 (transcribed from microfiche), available at 
http://home. gwu.edu/~jjhawkin/BlackCodes/BlackCodes.htm. 
 136. Id. 
 137. FONER, supra note 53, at 201. 
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enshrines in federal law the exact civil rights that southern legislatures 
associated with economic freedom and attempted to abridge in order to 
reintroduce a form of de facto slavery.138 The Civil Rights Act’s 
provision that all citizens “shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and 
penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or 
custom, to the contrary notwithstanding”139 can be understood as a 
rebuke to southern courts that imposed penalties aimed at condemning 
freedmen to involuntary servitude and uncompensated menial labor for 
violations of the Black Codes. Finally, the Civil Rights Act of 1866’s 
provision “[t]hat the district courts of the United States, within their 
respective districts, shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several 
States, cognizance of all crimes and offences committed against the 
provisions of this act”140 extended the protection of federal courts as a 
haven from the bias of southern judges and juries. Though limited in 
scope to civil rights involving economic opportunity, the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 was clearly understood to be a rebuke to the attempts of 
southern legislatures to reinstate slavery through a patchwork of labor 
and vagrancy laws. 
The original public meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 has been 
the subject of dispute. Dictionary definitions, as we have seen, compel 
the conclusion that anti-miscegenation laws violated the Act. The 
objective meaning of the words in the Act being clear, we turn now to 
evidence that the general public understood the Act as having the 
meaning that dictionary definitions suggest. To establish this, we look at 
editorials about the Act published in the leading newspapers of the time. 
Newspaper editorials played a key role in the public debates over the 
Act during the time it was under consideration by Congress. We look 
here at editorials in the most widely circulated newspapers in the five 
most populous American cities at that time: Baltimore, Boston, New 
York, Philadelphia, and Saint Louis.141 We find that, although there was 
disagreement as to whether the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was a good idea 
as a matter of public policy, the interpretation of the Act as conferring 
 
 138. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, § 1 (1866). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. § 3. 
 141. Baltimore had a population of 212,000 in 1860 and 267,000 in 1870. Boston had a 
population of 178,000 in 1860 and 251,000 in 1870. New York had a population of 175,000 in 1860 
and 1,478,000 in 1870. Philadelphia had a population of 566,000 in 1860 and 674,000 in 1870. Saint 
Louis had a population of 161,000 in 1860 and 311,000 in 1870. B.R. MITCHELL, INTERNATIONAL 
HISTORICAL STATISTICS: THE AMERICAS 1750–2005, at 46–48 (6th ed. 2007). 
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the same common law civil rights on all citizens without regard to race 
was broadly accepted across the country. We look at statements by both 
the proponents and the opponents of the Act and find that both groups 
thought the Act mandated equality of common law civil rights. 
The earliest press coverage of the Civil Rights Bill focused on its use 
of terms like “the same right,” “full and equal benefit,” and “there shall 
be no discrimination”—terms which we have just shown suggest anti-
miscegenation laws were banned by the Act. These editorials, published 
in January of 1866, show that the public debate over the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866 began with a full realization of the fact that the law was an 
equalizing measure that sought the exact same rights for all citizens of 
the United States. Thus, the Philadelphia Inquirer describe the content of 
the Act as follows on January 4, 1866: 
The [civil rights] bill is of a permanent character and applicable to all 
parts of the United States. It declares that the inhabitants of every race 
and color, without regard to former slavery, shall have the same right to 
make and inforce contracts, sue, be parties, give evidence, to inherit, 
purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property, to full 
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person 
and property, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains and 
penalties, and none other, any law, statute, regulation or custom to the 
contrary notwithstanding. 
Other provisions of the bill make it a criminal offense for any person 
under color of law or custom to deprive another of his civil rights and 
immunities, give the United States Courts exclusive jurisdiction of the 
cases of all persons thus discriminated against, and of all offenses 
committed against the provisions of the act; make it the duty of the 
judicial authorities of the United States, aided, if necessary, by the 
military forces, to execute the law and provide all the machinery for 
making the bill effective. 
Nearly all the provisions of the old fugitive slave act are incorporated 
into this bill, and the statute originally devised to keep in slavery is now 
reversed to secure their freedom.142 
The general public in New York and Philadelphia was thus informed 
of the content and language of the Act.143 The need for the Civil Rights 
 
 142. Senator Trumbull’s Bill, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jan. 5, 1866; see also The Freedmen’s 
Bureau and the Protection of Civil Rights, N.Y. TRIBUNE, Jan. 5, 1866. 
 143. See The Bill to Protect All Persons in their Civil Rights, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jan. 
30, 1866. The Philadelphia Inquirer adds on January 30, 1866: 
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Act of 1866 was explained to readers in the following language from the 
New York Tribune on February 5, 1866: 
Mr. Trumbull’s two bills—to enlarge the powers of the Freedmen’s 
Bureau, and to protect all the American People in their natural civil 
rights—are notoriously demanded by and adapted to our existing state 
of facts. If the laws and usages of the Southern States were just and 
equal, they would be superfluous. They are needed simply because at 
the South a Black man, solely because he is Black, is denied the 
common rights of human beings—is treated as having no rights that 
Whites are bound to respect. The laws of the South, and still more the 
dominant opinion and spirit of the South, treat the Blacks as brutes 
rather than men. All this will pass away; but meantime, a good many of 
the humbler race will be starved or lashed to death, unless Congress 
shall protect them. This, and nothing more, is what Mr. Trumbull’s 
bills aim to do—what they seem admirably calculated to do; and 
Congress is not merely justified in passing them—it could not fail to do 
so without a gross and cruel violation of public faith.144 
Subsequent editorial content in favor of the bill not only concurred 
on its meaning, but also on its purpose in constructing a freer and fair 
society for the freedmen in every state. Citizens across the country were 
aware of the immense discrimination in the South and of the fact that the 
Black Codes were intended to re-subjugate the African American 
population. But editorial writers were also aware of racially 
discriminatory statutes in northern states and in the territories that 
violated the provisions of the Civil Rights Bill, and editorialists accepted 
that the bill, if enacted, would nullify these discriminatory measures as 
well. Remarkably, supporters recognized the necessity of removing these 
 
Mr. Trumbull called up the bill to protect all persons in the enjoyment of their civil rights, 
and to furnish the means of their vindication. It provides that there shall be no 
discrimination in civil rights or immunities among the inhabitants of any State or 
Territory of the United States on account of race, color or previous condition of slavery; 
but the inhabitants of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of 
slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party 
shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right to make and enforce contracts, 
to sue, be parties and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real 
and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 
security of person and property, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains and 
penalties, and to none other; any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom to the 
contrary notwithstanding. The remainder of the bill prescribes punishments for the 
violation of the above provision by fine and imprisonment. 
Id. 
 144. Denunciation of Congress, N.Y. TRIBUNE, Feb. 5, 1866. 
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racially discriminatory laws in order to create a more just and cohesive 
society. These sentiments were best captured in the North American and 
United States Gazette on February 5, 1866, which wrote as follows: 
On Friday last the United States Senate passed an act, introduced by 
Mr. Trumbull, of Illinois, to guarantee civil liberty to all the people of 
the United States, the importance of which cannot easily be 
exaggerated. . . . [I]t was so clearly demanded by the present condition 
of affairs at the south, that various attempts at accomplishing the same 
purpose have been made this session in both houses of Congress. This 
one of Mr. Trumbull is thoroughly elaborated, and superior to all the 
rest of the measures pending . . . . The House is devoting its attention to 
constitutional amendments, two of which it has already passed, while 
the Senate has passed two statutes intended to apply to evils at the 
south. 
Of these the one now before us is much the most important, although it 
could hardly be carried into effect without the other, which provides the 
machinery for the purpose, by extending the operations of the 
Freedmen’s Bureau . . . . 
The first section of the bill declares to be citizens of the United States 
all men born in its limits, not subject to any foreign Power, excluding 
Indians not taxed, and orders that there shall be no discrimination in 
civil rights or immunities among the inhabitants of any State or 
territory in the republic on account of race, color or previous condition 
of slavery, and that all shall have the same right to make and to enforce 
contracts, to sue, be parties and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, sell, 
hold, and convey real and personal property, and be entitled to full and 
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and 
property, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains and penalties, 
and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom to 
the contrary notwithstanding. 
This section states the whole matter at issue at this time, for if these 
things were guaranteed by the south voluntarily, all trouble would be 
ended and the reign of harmony prevail everywhere. It is precisely 
because they are not so guaranteed by the revolted States that the 
national government is perplexed to know how to deal with the 
subject. . . . Even in States where partial concessions have been made, 
codes of laws to regulate the freed men have been passed most 
barbarous in their character. It is plain, then, that this statute of Senator 
Trumbull supplements the policy of President Johnson—takes up the 
work where the conquered rebels stopped short, and carries it through 
to the end.  
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[I]t nullifies at one stroke all the whole mass of black codes the 
rebellious States have been so carefully cooking up since the recovery 
of their State powers, to keep the black race in hopeless servitude. It 
recognizes all persons born under our flag to be citizens of the United 
States, so that for the first time in our history the entire colored race 
will be, in the eye of the law, people with a birthright of freedom and 
civil equality before the law. It is not alone in the south where this will 
be felt. States like Oregon and Indiana, which still maintain black 
codes, will find them annulled by this act, for as the Constitution 
guarantees to the citizens of any one State the liberty to go freely into 
any other State, statutes of exclusion, such as disgrace the codes of 
Oregon and Indiana, are not less obnoxious to the provisions of this act 
than the black codes of South Carolina and Mississippi. 
We presume that suffrage, being a political and not a civil right, is not 
included by the words of the bill, within the civil rights granted to all 
by its first section, although we perceive that some of our 
cotemporaries suppose so. The section particularizes in detail all the 
civil rights and immunities intended to be guaranteed, and suffrage is 
not among them. . . . 
Altogether, this is a most important bill, and one destined to work a 
thorough change in the condition of affairs, if properly enforced, as we 
cannot doubt it will be. It is thorough and stringent, but not a bit too 
much so.145 
Again, this editorial is striking in that it recognizes both that the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 created full equality of civil rights, although not of 
political rights, and that the Act would lead to changes in the law in 
Indiana and Oregon in so far as those states discriminated against 
African Americans. There is no hint here that the states would retain a 
power to pass Jim Crow laws. 
Two days after the publication of this remarkable editorial, the 
Boston Daily Journal, wrote on February 7, 1866: 
The passage of the bill shows the noble determination of Congress to 
provide for the security and rights of the emancipated race, and to 
watch over their interests in the transition from slavery to freedom amid 
the prejudices and the resentment of their [unreadable] masters. There 
has already been a revival of much old pro-slavery legislation in which 
the freedmen are treated as “vagrants,” but the action of Congress will 
 
 145. The Civil Liberty Bill, N. AM. & U.S. GAZETTE, Feb. 5, 1866. 
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convince the Southerners that colored people have recognized rights 
which white men are “bound to respect.”146 
The Boston Daily Journal does not suggest that somehow a category 
of Jim Crow laws might be allowed whereas the Black Codes were not. 
Instead, the paper posits a state of either slavery or freedom, and it 
presumes that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 mandates total freedom as to 
the specific civil rights the Act protected. Six days after that, the North 
American and United States Gazette wrote on February 12, 1866: 
The Civil Rights bill, to which we alluded on its passage by the Senate, 
is properly connected with this Freedmen’s Bureau bill, and taken 
together they will undoubtedly work great changes in the rebellious 
States. They must render nugatory all efforts of the dominant rebel 
influence to re-impose a pernicious system of caste upon the south and 
to deprive the freedmen of their civil rights, or of the legal means of 
defence.147 
Again, the North American and United States Gazette did not 
mention any category of social rights (an important omission that we will 
discuss later in this Article), as to which there need not be equality 
between the races, nor did it leave any room for allowance of Jim Crow 
laws while overturning the Black Codes. Instead, the paper rejected the 
South’s effort to re-impose a caste system—a system that was ultimately 
sustained by the ban on racial intermarriage. The next day, the North 
American and United States Gazette wrote: 
 Our duty is plain enough. We have it imperatively resting on us to 
protect the freedmen, enforce their civil rights, see them allowed a fair 
chance for rising in the scale of civilization, break up the legal 
[unreadable] some of the States are trying to organize under the name 
of militia to act as patrols and make men slaves again on the old 
plantations, annul every rebel act of their executives or legislatures, 
maintain freedom of speech and of the press, the liberty of migration, 
white or black, and in fact, to destroy the reign of terror at the south, 
upon which alone rests the whole power of the plantation oligarchy. 
We cannot retreat from this line of policy without peril to the future of 
the republic. If we act up to it steadily, unflinchingly, heeding no 
 
 146. Senator Sumner’s Speech – Debate on the Indemnification of Legal West Virginia – 
Speech of Senator Clark of N.H. – The Passage of the Freedman’s Bureau Bill, BOS. DAILY J., Feb. 
7, 1866. 
 147. The Practical Work of Reconstruction, N. AM. & U.S. GAZETTE, Feb. 12, 1866. 
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resistance or clamor, or influence intended to arrest our progress, a 
short time will break up the danger entirely.148 
The paper clearly recognized that the South was trying to reinforce a 
racial caste system to maintain the power of oligarchical plantation 
interests. 
The focus of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 on protecting all civil 
rights was recognized in the Boston Daily Journal on February 23, 1866, 
when it wrote: “There is no substantial disagreement among loyal men 
respecting their civil rights. We all agree that they must have the civil 
rights of any other class of citizens, the rights of person and property, to 
sue and to be sued—in short equality before the laws.”149 
The Philadelphia Inquirer said essentially the same thing on the 
same day: 
There is no substantial disagreement amongst loyal men respecting 
their civil rights. We all agree that they must have the civil rights of any 
other class of citizens. The right of person and property, to sue and be 
sued, and to certify, in short, equality before the law; but whether they 
shall also have the suffrage is a pending question.150 
Equality of civil rights was taken to be a given—the only area of 
disagreement was whether to give freed African Americans equal voting 
rights as well. The New York Daily Tribune on February 28, 1866, went 
further and hinted at some voting rights for African Americans: 
 We appeal, then, to the Statesmen of the South—and she still has 
statesmen—to take ground boldly for a comprehensive and complete 
reconciliation—one that shall include every class in every section—that 
shall leave no discontents, no heart-burnings, no chances of future 
insurrections and civil war. ALL RIGHTS FOR ALL—is our platform; 
which does not imply that every man shall be a voter, but that color 
shall not be a perpetual disqualification—that every rational youth or 
man may confidently aspire and hope to become a member of the body 
politic by faithfully endeavoring to qualify himself therefor.151 
The New York Daily Tribune called for “all rights for all.” It would 
be hard to read that as somehow allowing for Jim Crow while 
disallowing the Black Codes. 
 
 148. The Present Attitude at the South, N. AM. & U.S. GAZETTE, Feb. 13, 1866. 
 149. The Country in No Peril, BOS. DAILY J., Feb. 23, 1866. 
 150. Views of David Dudley Field, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Feb. 23, 1866. 
 151. The Main Question – Partial or Perfect Peace, N.Y. DAILY TRIBUNE, Feb. 28, 1866. 
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It is necessary to clarify here that the Black Codes, which were 
nullified by the Civil Rights Act of 1866, did not all discriminate on their 
face. Some of the Black Codes were stripped of textual references to race 
precisely to elude accusations of racial discrimination and because word 
of the impending passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 had spread. 
Following an uproar in the North over the harsh and explicitly racist 
Black Codes of Mississippi and South Carolina, subsequent southern 
legislatures enacting Black Codes omitted explicit textual references to 
race.152 But, as famed Reconstruction historian Eric Foner notes in a 
quotation from Alabama planter and Democrat John W. DuBose, when 
the Black Codes spoke of vagrants, “the vagrant contemplated was the 
plantation negro.”153 
As the winter of 1866 wore on, President Andrew Johnson startled 
congressional Republicans by vetoing the first Freedman’s Bureau 
Act.154 Johnson thought the Act was too socialistic, but he also opposed 
giving African Americans equal civil rights with white Americans.155 
Senate Republicans tried and failed to overturn the veto.156 For a while, 
some congressional Republicans working on passing the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866 hoped that President Johnson would sign that act because it gave 
African Americans equal civil rights but it did not give them equal 
political rights.157 The New York Daily Tribune thus wrote on March 1, 
1866: 
Whatever else may fail, we trust that Mr. Trumbull’s bill extending 
legal protection to the civil rights of Blacks, which has already passed 
the Senate, will soon pass the House also. That it is urgently needed, 
the action of Southern legislatures abundantly proves. Say, if you can, 
 
 152. FONER, supra note 53, at 201. 
 153. FONER, supra note 53, at 201 (citing and quoting S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 6, 172–77, 180–83, 
222–26, 209–10 (1866); JOHN W. DUBOSE, ALABAMA’S TRAGIC DECADE: TEN YEARS OF 
ALABAMA, 1865–1874, at 55 (James K. Greer ed., 1940); JOHN T. O’BRIEN, FROM BONDAGE TO 
CITIZENSHIP: THE RICHMOND BLACK COMMUNITY, 1865–1867, at 304 (1974); MICHAEL WAYNE, 
THE RESHAPING OF PLANTATION SOCIETY: THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 1860–80 46–47 (1983); 
THEODORE BRANTNER WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH 96–100 (1965); William Cohen, 
Negro Involuntary Servitude in the South, 1865–1940: A Preliminary Analysis, 42 J. S. HIST. 31, 35–
50 (1976)). 
 154. FONER, supra note 53, at 247.  
 155. See Andrew Johnson’s Veto of the Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, Feb. 19, 1866, 
reprinted in 1 VETO MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, WITH THE ACTION OF 
CONGRESS THEREON 289 (Benjamin Perley Poore, comp. 1886); see also Andrew Johnson’s Veto of 
the Civil Rights Act to the Senate of the United States, Mar. 27, 1866, id. at 297. 
 156. FONER, supra note 53, at 249. 
 157. FONER, supra note 53, at 250. 
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that all the direct and positive testimony of White outrages on the 
Freedmen is false—and there is more of it than can be cited in support 
of any fact in history—yet the single fact that no single Southern 
Legislature has yet recognized the right of Blacks to the civil rights 
accorded to every White alien, suffices to prove the need of such 
legislation by Congress as Mr. Trumbull’s bill provides. We believe no 
single Southern State has yet enabled Blacks to sue and be sued, to give 
testimony and rebut testimony, on equal terms with Whites. All that 
they do, under the pressure of necessity, is meanly, grudgingly, 
shabbily done. What can be more absurd than to provide that a Black 
may testify in cases between Blacks and Whites, but not when the 
parties are both White? If he would ever swear falsely, would he not be 
likely to do so in a case between a White and a Black? And, if his oath 
can be taken in cases where he will naturally have a bias, why not in 
cases where he is likely to have none? . . .  
Why is the distinction made but to insult and degrade the Blacks? The 
Cincinnati Commercial has a letter from a correspondent traveling 
through Mississippi, who states that the barbarous Vagrant law recently 
passed by the Rebel State Legislature is rigidly enforced, and under its 
provisions the freed slaves are rapidly being reenslaved. No negro is 
allowed to buy, rent, or lease any real estate; all minors of any value are 
taken from their parents and bound out to planters: and every freedman 
who does not contract for a year’s labor is taken up as a vagrant. The 
officers of the Freedmen’s Bureau are often not accessible, and the 
freedmen are kept back, by the distance, from complaining. Finally, as 
the writer estimates, it would take an army of 20,000 men to compel the 
planters to do justice to the freedmen. 
Mr. Trumbull’s bill takes right hold of this matter, and subjects the 
oppressors to pains and penalties which they will seldom choose to 
invoke. We pray that it be passed soon, even though it should cost the 
Copperheads and impenitent Rebels more than they can well afford to 
pay for the powder they will expend in celebrating the Veto.158 
 
On March 9, 1866, the House of Representatives debated a suggestion to 
amend the bill, striking the general provision concerning civil rights and 
leaving the specifically enumerated list of rights in Section 1.159 The 
general civil rights language, which was eliminated, provided “[t]hat 
there shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities among the 
 
 158. Civil Rights, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Mar. 1, 1866. 
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inhabitants of any State or Territory of the United States on account of 
race, color, or previous condition of slavery.”160 
On March 13, the House adopted the version of the bill that did not 
include the general civil rights language.161 Alexander Bickel’s focus on 
original intent characterizes this event as an important one in determining 
the meaning of the bill.162 However, not only did the bill’s main 
proponent in the House of Representatives disagree on whether the 
deletion of the general language changed the meaning of the bill,163 the 
common understanding of the bill seemed to remain the same. 
Concurrent with and immediately after the revision, the pending Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 was described as follows by the New York Herald. 
 Writing on April 13, 1866, the paper said: 
This is the law. It sweeps away not only all the old slave codes and free 
negro laws of the Southern States, but the legislation which they have 
adopted in reference to their black population since the suppression of 
the rebellion and their submission to the supreme authority of the 
United States.164 
A sister paper, the New York Tribune, said the next day on March 14, 
1866: 
It is of very great importance that some legislation should be perfected 
for the protection of the freedmen. We believe this bill contains the 
seeds of a reform sure to be widely beneficial. It is just, moderate, and 
constitutional; and while other measures are delayed, there is the more 
urgent need for the speedy enactment of this. Let us do something—let 
Congress do something—to assure the country that its zeal for justice 
and equal rights is not to issue in fruitless dissensions.165 
The paper was clearly appealing in the wake of President Johnson’s 
veto of the first Freedman’s Bureau Bill for some moderate legislation 
protecting equal civil rights. The North American and United States 
Gazette described the Civil Rights Bill on March 16, 1866, saying: “This 
bill, against which these Democrats voted, merely guarantees to the 
freedmen the right to hold property, to collect wages by suit, and to 
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 162. BICKEL, supra note 21, at 25–26. 
 163. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS., 1366. 
 164. N.Y. HERALD, Mar. 13, 1866. 
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protect their liberty by legal proceedings.”166 The same day the Boston 
Daily Journal said, “The Senate concurred to-day in the amendments of 
the House to the bill for the protection of all persons in the United States 
in their civil rights, and for furnishing the means of their vindication.”167 
Supporters of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 described it as giving 
African Americans equal civil rights with white Americans, thus 
overturning the Black Codes and Chief Justice Roger Taney’s statements 
in Dred Scott v. Sandford to the effect that free African Americans could 
never be citizens or the white man’s equal. As the New York Herald said 
on March 17, 1866: 
In a word, this bill, in regard to his civil rights, places the black man 
throughout the United States upon the same footing with the white 
man, and furnishes ample facilities for the enforcement of the law 
everywhere by the executive, judicial and military authorities of the 
United States. This is a tremendous transformation of the old order of 
things, when it was decreed from the Supreme Court by Chief Justice 
Taney that the negro, bond or free, was not an American citizen, and 
had “no rights which the white man was bound to respect.” But this 
decision we find under the constitution as it was, when these civil 
disabilities of the African race were accepted or tolerated by all 
departments of the government as necessary to the protection of the 
Southern institution of African slavery. With the abolition of this 
institution, the foundation upon which all of these distinctions rested, 
they too are all swept away. Under the constitution as it is slavery is 
abolished and interdicted over all the States and Territories, and 
Congress has “the power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation.” 
But does the power to enforce the freedom of the blacks involve the 
power to enforce their equal civil rights as citizens over the legislation 
of the several States? It seems to us that such is the scope of this 
constitutional amendment. Take away slavery, and as there is no color 
in the constitution, all men of every color stand upon the same level as 
citizens of the United States. The enforcement of this amendment, 
therefore, abolishing slavery, involves the power to enforce this 
equality in civil rights. Upon this subject it follows that not only are all 
the old slave codes and black laws of the South abolished, but that the 
reconstructive legislation of the late rebel States, from Virginia to 
Texas, embracing one system of laws for the whites, and another for 
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the blacks, must all go by the board. Does this interfere with the 
reconstruction policy of President Johnson? We think not. On the 
contrary, it relieves him of a vast amount of the troublesome work in 
the protection of the civil rights of the freedmen. 
This Civil Rights bill we regard, accordingly, as a practical, just and 
beneficent measure, and one which the President will cheerfully 
approve. It does not touch the question of negro suffrage, and it does 
not provide for the encouragement of laziness among the Southern 
blacks and white refugees by inviting them to laugh and grow fat upon 
the public treasury.168 
This New York Herald editorial emphasizes that while the Civil 
Rights Bill did not give African Americans the right to vote, it did 
“place[] the black man throughout the United States upon the same 
footing with the white man . . . .”169 The editorial clearly realizes that the 
Civil Rights Bill gave African Americans equal civil rights to white 
Americans.170 While the editorial does not say the Bill will allow racial 
intermarriage, it does not recognize a social sphere in which Jim Crow 
laws might be constitutionally permissible while the Black Codes were 
not.171 
An editorial in a Boston paper two days later would have gone even 
further and would have given African American men the right to vote. 
Thus, the Boston Daily Journal wrote on March 19, 1866: 
[T]he prevalent opinion here is that it [the Civil Rights bill] will be 
signed and will become a portion of the law of the land. Black men at 
the South will then “be entitled to the full and equal benefit of all laws 
for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, 
and shall be subject to like punishment, and to none other.” The 
question then arises, if these black men can receive civil rights from 
Congress, should they not also receive from the same source the 
political right to suffrage?172 
The Baltimore Sun took note of the contents of the Civil Rights 
Bill.173 
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The Senate sponsor of the Civil Rights Bill had been Senator Lyman 
Trumbull of Illinois, a former friend and competitor of President 
Abraham Lincoln.174 Trumbull was a staunch advocate of equal rights 
for African Americans.175 It is thus interesting to see what the Illinois 
newspapers said about the meaning and purpose of the Civil Rights Bill. 
The Chicago Tribune, on March 28, 1866, described it as follows: 
The bill itself is a simple enactment to carry into effect the 
Constitutional Amendment abolishing slavery, as was justly 
characterized by Senator Trumbull as the most important measure that 
had been considered by Congress since the adoption of the 
Amendment. The spirit of the bill is fully expressed in its title—a bill to 
secure the civil rights of men, who, heretofore being slaves, had no 
civil rights which anybody was bound to respect. It proposed to confer 
no political rights. It gave to the freedman that which the laws of all 
civilized nations give to every man—the right to make and enforce 
contracts, to sue, be parties and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, 
lease sell, hold and convey real and personal property, and full and 
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and 
property. The machinery for the bill was operative only in States where 
these natural and inalienable rights were denied by the rebellious 
majority of the whites, as for instance in the State of Mississippi, one of 
whose statutes provides that if any person of African descent residing 
in that State travels from one county to another without having a pass 
or certificate of his freedom, he is liable to be committed to jail and to 
be dealt with as a person who is in the State without authority. Other 
provisions of the state prohibit any negro or mulatto from having fire-
arms, and one provision of the statute declares that for “exercising the 
functions of a minister of the Gospel free negroes and mulattoes, on 
 
The civil rights bill, which has passed both houses of Congress and now awaits the action 
of the President, is intended to secure to all persons of whatever race or color, exclusive 
of Indians not taxed, “the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce 
contracts, to sue, to be sued, be parties and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, 
hold and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,” and 
to make them subject to the same penalties, pains and punishments, and no others, any 
law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom to the contrary notwithstanding. It provides 
that any person who shall cause any citizen to be deprived of either of the rights above 
recited shall be punished . . . . 
The Civil Rights Bill, BALT. SUN, Mar. 24, 1866. 
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conviction, may be punished by any number of lashes not exceeding 
thirty-nine, on the bare back, and shall pay the costs.” Other provisions 
of the statute of Mississippi prohibit a free negro or mulatto from 
keeping a house of entertainment, and subject him to trial before two 
justices of the peace and five slaveholders for violating the provisions 
of this law. The statutes of South Carolina make it a highly penal 
offense for any person, white or colored, to teach blacks to read. These 
and similar laws violating the spirit of Republican institutes abound in 
all the Southern States. Their purpose is to keep slavery alive until it 
can be re-established by law. Against this whole slave machinery the 
Civil Rights bill is battering ram. Without it, or something equally 
effective, the Constitutional Amendment is a delusion—a mere 
mouthful of spoken wind—a glittering generality as worthless to 
enforce the great fist of the people, as was the Declaration of 
Independence itself to give freedom to all men.176 
This Chicago Tribune editorial clearly did not contemplate that a 
category of Jim Crow laws would survive the Civil Rights Bill’s 
enactment while the Black Codes would not. 
On March 27, President Andrew Johnson, already embroiled in 
disagreement with his own party regarding his recent veto of the first 
Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, issued a veto message that rejected the specific 
terms and underlying principle of the proposed Civil Rights Act of 
1866.177 The two bills taken together had united the radical and moderate 
wings of the Republican Party behind Senator Trumbull, who was widely 
viewed as being a Republican moderate and leader in the Senate who had 
sponsored both pieces of legislation.178 Support for the Freedman’s 
Bureau Bill and the Civil Rights Bill had grown steadily as report after 
report had arrived in Washington, D.C., from the southern states 
describing pervasive persecution of freedmen, of loyal white citizens, 
and of northerners then living in the South.179 In light of the emerging 
conclusion that the southern states could not refrain from blatant 
discrimination without federal intervention, Republicans felt secure that 
President Johnson would sign both the first Freedmen’s Bureau Bill and 
the Civil Rights Bill.180 Yet on February 19 of 1866, President Johnson 
had vetoed the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, mischaracterizing the agency as 
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a “permanent branch of the public administration” when it was meant to 
be temporary, and making arguments that foreshadowed his veto of all 
subsequent Republican Reconstruction legislation, including the Civil 
Rights Bill.181 
Johnson’s veto message regarding the Civil Rights Bill was stunning 
in its harsh racism, and it permanently alienated Johnson from both the 
moderate and radical wings of the Republican Party.182 Johnson’s veto 
message crystallized the resolve of congressional Republicans to 
override his veto, and it provoked outrage from both sides in the public 
debate over the Bill.183 The Chicago Tribune, on Thursday, March 29, 
1866, articulated the oft-made distinction between civil and political 
rights, and expressed support for granting freedmen the former: 
The President asks if they “possess the requisite qualifications to entitle 
them to all the privileges and immunities of citizens.” This bill does not 
confer on them the right of suffrage, but only protection to person and 
property. What “qualifications” does the President think a man ought to 
possess in order to be entitled to protection. What “qualifications” must 
a black man have more than a white man needs to enable him to sue for 
his wages, to own land, to hire a house, to labor for his family, to 
defend his house, his wife and children? . . .  
. . . . 
Finally the President leaves wholly out of view the fact that the bill has 
no operation per se, except in so far as the Southern people give it 
operation and effect, by attempting to pass different laws for the blacks 
over those that govern the whites. . . . [I]t only begins to operate when 
the Southern whites begin to oppress . . . and it ceases altogether when 
oppression ceases. The author of the veto of such a bill will go down in 
history side by side with Taney and John Tyler, if he does not rise to an 
infamy still more conspicuous.184 
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http://wps.prenhall.com/wps/media/objects/107/109768/ch16_a2_d1.pdf. 
 182. The Second Veto, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 1866; President Andrew Johnson’s Veto of the 
Civil Rights Act to the Senate of the United States (Mar. 27, 1866), available at 
http://wps.prenhall.com/wps/media/objects/107/109768/ch16_a2_d1.pdf. 
 183. Senator Sherman and the President’s Veto, N.Y. HERALD, Mar. 31, 1866; How the 
President’s Veto was Received, N.Y. TRIB., Mar. 31, 1866. 
 184. The Veto Message, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 29, 1866. 
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The very same day, the Boston Daily Journal editorialized in favor 
of the necessity of equality as to civil rights to secure the good of the 
Union. The Boston Daily Journal wrote on March 29, 1866: 
We deeply regret the appearance of [the veto]. The bill which it seeks 
to suppress was framed in furtherance of an object of transcendent 
importance, made necessary by the triumph of the national cause, and 
dear to the hearts of the patriotic masses. That object is to secure the 
equality of American citizenship, to realize for the first time the 
fundamental doctrines of the Declaration of Independence and carry out 
the avowed purposes of the Constitution. The loyal people are perfectly 
convinced that in this way only can we end up the gigantic evils 
illustrated by and inherited from the rebellion, and restore solid 
harmony and prosperity to the regenerated Union. As the flag is one 
and the country is one, the law must be one, reaching to every citizen 
alike, conveying the same rights and securities, without regard to color 
or former class and condition. When we get down to that broad and 
solid foundation everything will [unreadable] well, and not before. 
And yet when a measure of those beneficent aims is brought before the 
President, instead of looking upon it favorably, and even, as might be 
supposed, stretching his desire to approve the main features of the bill 
to cover some objectionable details, he makes the details the main thing 
and regards the whole bill as critically as if its purpose were to give 
power to a corporation or to a class, instead of diffusing equality among 
all. No great measure—certainly no measure adequate to the exigency 
which this is designed to meet—could be criticized in this minute way 
without finding many apparent objections, and it must be said that 
several of those urged by the President are only apparent . . . . 
Everything in the Southern States is now against the negro—the laws, 
the customs, the habits, and the prejudices of the white and ruling class. 
All the dice are loaded against the freedman, and he has a fair chance 
nowhere, outside the protection of the Federal bayonets and the Federal 
laws. This civil rights bill was designed to furnish him adequate and 
permanent security, and we believe it does it with no injury and as little 
inconvenience to the whites as is possible under the circumstances. We 
are sorry that the President does not so regard it, and we hope it will be 
repassed over his veto.185 
Let us emphasize here that the Boston Daily Journal recognized that 
“[a]s the flag is one and the country is one, the law must be one, reaching 
to every citizen alike . . . without regard to color or former class and 
 
 185. The President’s Veto of the Civil Rights Bill, BOS. DAILY J., Mar. 29, 1866. 
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condition.”186 There is no room here to read the Civil Rights Bill as if it 
somehow allowed Jim Crow laws while disallowing the Black Codes. 
The paper clearly calls for the complete abolition of all racial 
classifications in lawmaking. 
Public opinion supporting Andrew Johnson’s veto of the Civil Rights 
Bill echoed his view that to legally equalize all citizens was to 
disempower white citizens.187 As in Johnson’s veto message, the 
editorials supporting the veto display blatant racism.188 They also 
contain the constitutional arguments that the Fourteenth Amendment 
ultimately repudiated.189 Again and again the opponents of the Civil 
Rights Bill expressed fear about blacks voting, even though it was well 
understood by everyone that the Bill conferred equal civil rights but not 
equal political rights.190 In light of the commonly understood distinction 
between civil and political rights, it is hard not to think that the 
arguments the opponents of the Civil Rights Bill raised were not a red 
herring. The framers and proponents of the Civil Rights Bill had, by this 
time, said over and over again that the extension of equal civil rights to 
blacks did not mean the extension of equal political rights. It was well 
known that some proponents of the Civil Rights Bill hoped the vote 
would be extended someday, and this desire was in fact articulated in 
several of the editorials we cite here.191 But the argument that the Civil 
Rights Bill secured any rights aside from full equality of civil rights was 
contrary to both the text of the Bill and to all the statements of its 
meaning in newspaper editorials. 
Still, the critics of the Civil Rights Bill did raise the specter of 
enfranchisement and of social equality as a means for drumming up 
further opposition to the Bill. Thus, the New York Herald on March 29, 
1866, wrote: 
 
 186. Id. 
 187. Endorsement of President Johnson, N.Y. HERALD, Mar. 29, 1866. 
 188. Andrew Johnson and Andrew Jackson—The Moral Power of Moral Courage. N.Y. 
HERALD, Mar. 31, 1866; The Connecticut Election—The Real Issues Before the Voters, N.Y. 
HERALD, Mar. 31, 1866; In Favor of President Johnson’s Policy, Against Negro Equality, Opposed 
to $450,000 Additional School Tax, ST. LOUIS MO. REPUBLICAN, Mar. 29, 1866; Negro Superiority, 
ST. LOUIS MO. REPUBLICAN, Apr. 8, 1866. 
 189. President Johnson’s Appeal to the People, N.Y. HERALD, Mar. 29, 1866. 
 190. Veto of the Civil Rights Bill, N. AM. & U.S. GAZETTE, Mar. 28, 1866. The Present 
Attitude at the South, N. AM. & U.S. GAZETTE, Feb. 13, 1866; The Civil Rights Bill, BALT. SUN,  
Mar. 24, 1866. 
 191. The Civil Rights Bill, BOS. DAILY J., Mar. 19, 1866. The New Veto. N.Y. TRIB., Mar. 28, 
1866. 
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The veto message shows irrefutably that the radicals design to make 
this a mongrel government. It has unmasked them; they can no longer 
maintain their hypocritical pretence of philanthropy. They hope and 
expect to confer the right of suffrage upon the negroes; to elect negro 
members of Congress from the Southern States; to make negroes 
eligible for the highest offices in the land. The political equality for the 
blacks thus conceded, how can their social equality be denied? They 
must be permitted to propose marriage to our daughters; to sit at table 
with white persons; to mingle familiarly in the best society. 
More than this: we are asked to give the semi-civilized negro a 
preference over the intelligent immigrant who lands upon our shores; to 
punish a parent who refuses to allow a negro to marry his child; to cast 
into prison any judge who decides the dicta of Congress 
unconstitutional; . . . This is what the radicals demand, and all this they 
have embodied in the Civil Rights bill, which ought to be called a bill 
to deprive white men of all rights. . . . All who are in favor of 
assassinating the republic in order to make the negro equal to the 
whites will take sides with Congress.192 
The New York Herald explicitly claims that the Civil Rights Bill 
would lead to voting rights for African Americans as well as to racial 
intermarriage and “a mongrel government.” As the paper says, “all this 
they have embodied in the Civil Rights bill.”193 More credible opponents 
of the Civil Rights Bill confined themselves to expressing concern over 
its consequences for the relative role of the federal government and the 
states.194 
 
 192. President Johnson’s Appeal to the People, N.Y. HERALD, Mar. 29, 1866. This paragraph 
continues: 
For the sake of three millions of negroes forty millions of white people have already been 
involved in civil war; half of a great nation has been crippled and desolated; a heavy debt 
has been placed upon the shoulders of our citizens; blood has been poured out like water; 
precious lives have been ruthlessly sacrificed; but all this is not enough. Now, for the 
sake of three millions of negroes, the white people of this country are asked to submit to 
the abrogation of the constitution; to the exclusion of eleven States from the Union; to the 
super-sedure of the State judiciary; to the petty tyranny of irresponsible spies, paid to 
prefer complaints, whether justly or unjustly. 
Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See The President’s Objections to the Civil Rights Bill, BALT. SUN, Apr. 2, 1886. 
The more closely the provisions of the civil rights bill are considered, the more 
powerfully will every candid mind be impressed with the importance of the service which 
President Johnson has rendered by vetoing the measure. It is not so much the evils which 
practically might flow from the administration of the law as the dangerous consequences 
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Intermixed into the editorial comments of the opponents of the Bill 
are also concerns about social equality that fit neither into the scheme of 
civil nor political rights.195 These concerns seem clearly intended as 
scare tactics designed to incite racially charged hatred. The particular 
mention of interracial marriage as a possible result of the Civil Rights 
Act was raised in Congress by members in the debates,196 by President 
Johnson in his veto message,197 and in the public discourse.198 
Legislators and popular commentators struggled to explain how the Bill 
could guarantee liberty of contract to African Americans without also 
condoning interracial marriage.199 This blind spot in the debate over the 
Civil Rights Bill shows the pervasive nature of the racism alive at the 
time, and the stunning magnitude of the social changes brought about by 
the abolition of slavery. The idea that marriage is the outcome of a 
contract had been long established by 1866. Blackstone’s Commentaries 
had said as much authoritatively a century prior to Reconstruction.200 
 That the ability to enter into marriage contracts pertained to liberty of 
contract, or to the security of property, could not be questioned. The 
Civil Rights Act plainly on its face protected liberty of contract. Many of 
the editorials we have presented here make this point abundantly clear. 
That dissonance existed between the stated intent of the Bill with regard 
to the equalization of marriage rights and the legal reality of the Bill’s 
 
to public liberty from the admission of the general powers which the bill asserts, that 
mark the President’s message and give it intrinsic value. 
Id. 
 195. President Johnson’s Appeal to the People, N.Y. HERALD, Mar. 29, 1866. 
 196. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH  CONG., 1ST SESS. 1121 (1866). 
 197. President Andrew Johnson’s Veto of the Civil Rights Act to the Senate of the United 
States (Mar. 27, 1866), available at http://wps.prenhall.com/wps/media/objects/ 
107/109768/ch16_a2_d1.pdf. 
 198. The Veto of the Civil Rights Bill, ST. LOUIS MO DEMOCRAT, Apr. 3, 1866. President 
Johnson’s Appeal to the People, N.Y. HERALD, Mar. 29, 1866. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: CHAPTER THE 
FIFTEENTH: OF HUSBAND AND WIFE 421, available at http://avalon.law.yale. 
edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk4ch15.asp (“Our law Considers Marriage in no other light than as a 
Civil Contract”). In fact, Blackstone’s Commentaries were so well known, and held in such high 
regard, that Senator Lyman Trumbull invoked them in January 1866 on the Senate floor, citing 
directly from the text as he sought to authoritatively define “civil liberty” as 
no other than natural liberty, so far restrained by human laws and no further, as is 
necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the public . . . In this definition of 
civil liberty it ought to be understood, or rather expressed, that the restraints introduced 
by the law should be equal to all, or as much so as the nature of things will admit.  
CONG. GLOBE, 39TH  CONG., 1ST SESS. 474 (1866). 
1.CALABRESI.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2013  2:56 PM 
1393 Originalism and Loving v. Virginia 
 1453 
text can be attributed to genuine misunderstanding or willful 
misrepresentation for the purpose of securing its passage. Despite the 
level of detail available on these debates both in the public sphere and in 
the legislature, this is one distinction we may never be able to clarify.201 
Ironically, the strongest arguments for the equality of all contract 
rights, including rights to enter into marriage contracts, is perhaps best 
articulated by the detractors of the Civil Rights Act. 
The St. Louis Missouri Democrat on April 3, 1866, summarized 
President Johnson’s reasons for vetoing the Civil Rights Bill. The paper 
said: 
What are the President’s objections? That the Southern Congressmen 
have not been admitted! That the bill declares the freedman a citizen! 
That it makes him, before the law, an equal to another citizen! That this 
is an interference with the reserved rights of the States! That it 
abrogates the State statutes that discriminate against him because he 
has “a skin not colored like our own!” That the bill is, therefore, 
unconstitutional, tends to an undue centralization of government 
powers, and as a consequent subversion of Republican principles! 
[Unreadable] the noblest sentiment that ever inspired a people tried in 
the fires of a war between the demon of oppression and the angel of 
justice—is far less admirable than Taney’s demonstration that “the 
black man has no rights which the white man is bound to respect.” The 
“intensely logical spirit of evil” has been even more successful in its 
sophistries, but rarely more false to humanity than in this instance.202 
On April 6, 1866, the Senate passed the Civil Rights Act over the 
President’s veto.203 The House followed three days later.204 The passage 
of the act marked the first time Congress had enacted major legislation 
over a presidential veto in seventy-seven prior years of the history of the 
United States.205 The passage of the Civil Rights Act was lauded by 
some and bemoaned by others, but regardless of the rhetoric attached, the 
common understanding of the bill was that it stripped away any 
differences between white and African American citizens with regard to 
 
 201. Though Senator Lyman Trumbull addressed the implications of the bill on interracial 
marriage explicitly in Congress, he did not do so in his response to President Johnson’s veto 
message. This may be of note, given that Johnson raised a number of specific objections to the civil 
rights bill, each of which was addressed and refuted by Trumbull in his response, with the exception 
of the question of interracial marriage. 
 202. The Veto of the Civil Rights Bill, ST. LOUIS MO. DEMOCRAT, Apr. 3, 1866. 
 203. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1789 (1866). 
 204. Id. at 1865. 
 205. FONER, supra note 53, at 250–51. 
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the civil rights associated with the protection of contract, person, and 
property. 
The Act’s passage was celebrated in the Chicago Tribune, Senator 
Trumbull’s hometown newspaper, which said on Saturday, April 7: “The 
action of the Senate yesterday is a great victory. It will tell powerfully on 
the country, on the coming elections, and even the semi-barbarians 
whose treatment of colored people renders a Civil Rights Bill 
necessary.”206 And on Sunday, April 8, the Chicago Tribune further 
elaborated: 
The Southern Legislature can now enact that a colored man shall not 
own real or personal property, shall not work at any mechanical trade, 
shall not learn to read, shall not have a house, shall not leave his 
employer’s premises without a pass, shall be subject to corporal 
punishment at the hands of his ‘master’ or any other of those 
oppressive and mischievous laws by which the Southern Legislatures 
have already attempted to re-enslave the three millions which Abraham 
Lincoln and our Union armies made free. Every member of a 
Legislature who votes for a law, and every judge or officer who 
enforces one which operates any differently on a black man than it does 
upon a white, is liable to a fine of one thousand dollars and a term of 
imprisonment. Colored men born in this country are henceforth citizens 
of the United States and their respective states “and are to be so 
regarded. 
The achievement of this great triumph sent a thrill of satisfaction and 
relief throughout the hearts of the entire loyal people. We breathed 
freer, on learning that at last the law-making power, the supreme 
legislature of the country has asserted its own rights, and vindicated the 
cause of liberty, and that an effectual check is at least imposed on the 
President, who has all the arbitrary disposition of a Napoleon without 
his capacity to respond to the progressive instincts of the people.207 
The Tribune clearly thought the Civil Rights Act of 1866 had 
secured full equality of all civil rights. On the dissenting side, the St. 
Louis Missouri Republican on April 8, 1866, commemorated the passage 
of the Act by writing: 
Negro Superiority: The charge of the Radical revolutionists seek to 
bring about “negro equality” is faulty in not going far enough. The fact 
is, that they seek to give the negro a preference over the white man. 
 
 206. Passage of the Civil Rights Bill, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 7, 1866. 
 207. CHI. TRIB., Apr. 8, 1866. 
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They talk very plausibly about making all men “equal before the law,” 
but are at the same time contriving measures to make them unequal. 
Such is the character of the measures embodied in the bills, whose 
passage President Johnson has so nobly resisted. The same spirit is 
betrayed by some of those who are intrusted with the management of 
the freedmen.208  
. . . The negro, more favored, has . . . services for nothing. Is this that 
equality before the law, which these Radicals profess to desire so 
earnestly? . . . The truth is, the Radical politicians who now wield the 
power of Congress with such reckless and demoniac energy, mean to 
prefer the blacks over the great mass of whites.209 
The New York Herald asked sarcastically on April 9, 1866, after the 
Senate passage of the Civil Rights Act over President Johnson’s veto: 
And what next? Having secured their great object of placing all races 
and colors in all the States and Territories of the Union as citizens on a 
footing of equality in regard to their civil rights, and having placed the 
Southern blacks under the protection of the President, the Freedmen’s 
Bureau, and the judicial and military authorities of the United States, 
etc., may we not conclude that the radicals will be prepared to consider 
the claims of the excluded Southern States to a hearing in Congress?210 
Note that the Herald concedes that the Civil Rights Act led to 
complete equality between the races as to civil rights. From the St. Louis 
Missouri Democrat, on Tuesday, April 10, 1866: 
What They Think of the Veto in Canada. 
Here is what the Toronto Globe thinks of the President’s last veto: 
It is difficult to realize that this man, who has the hardihood to 
make these objections to the civil rights bill, is the same man who, 
during the war, was a violent advocate of abolition—who, after the 
war was over, promised to be the special protector of the blacks, 
 
 208. The editorial adds:  
This is shown in a recent order from the Freedmen’s Bureau, instructing all assistant 
commissioners to act as claim agents for colored soldiers and sailers [sic], in collecting 
their claims against the United States without charge, excepting for revenue stamps, 
salaries, fees, etc. Here, it is shown, the Government is made to step on and act as agent 
for black soldiers and sailers [sic], thus saving black men the expense of employing an 
agent, while no such favor is extended to white soldiers and sailors. 
 209. ST. LOUIS MO. REPUBLICAN, Apr. 8, 1866. 
 210. The Civil Rights Bill––Probable Action of the House To-Day, N.Y. HERALD  , Apr. 9, 
1866. 
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and talked of taking care that loyal men, white and black, should 
govern the South; and declared that the rebels should be punished, 
and that their treason should be made odious. What a change have 
a few months wrought in his Excellency! In the worst days of 
slavery its avowed advocates hardly put their hostility to justice 
between race and race in bolder or more shameless language. The 
civil rights bill deprives the States of the power to make civil 
distinctions between the two races—it deprives them of the right to 
have one set of laws for the blacks and another for the whites—of 
having one set of pains and penalties for white offenders and 
another for black—and, therefore, it is vetoed! These are the very 
reasons which ought to induce any honest man—any friend of 
justice—to sanction the measure. 
These are words of truth and soberness, not prompted by any of the 
partisan feeling which may be supposed to animate the journals of this 
country. It will be noticed, says the Chicago Republican, that they don’t 
differ much from what Republicans think and say on this side of the 
border.211 
The St. Louis Missouri Democrat continues saying: 
The Veto Vetoed. 
The Bill is not, as misrepresented, a bill admitting the freedmen to the 
ballot-box, or advancing him a step towards social equality with the 
white man, but simply to secure practically to him the rights which the 
common law from time immemorial has conceded to the humblest, yet 
which slavery had swept away, and which the ex-slaveholders were not 
ready to restore.212 
The paper concludes by saying: 
To Honest Conservatives.  
When the Constitution was adopted there were “free persons” and 
“persons held to labor or service”—freemen and slaves. The former, 
both black and white participated in adopting the Constitution. People 
of color voted in a majority of the States, and being citizens of those 
States were thereby, by the terms of the National Constitution, invested 
with the privileges and immunities of citizens of the other States also. 
But slavery assailed the citizenship of the free colored man and sought 
to place him politically on the plane of the slave. Slavery now being 
 
 211. What They Think of the Veto in Canada, ST. LOUIS MO. DEMOCRAT, Apr. 10, 1866. 
 212. The Veto Vetoed, ST. LOUIS MO. DEMOCRAT, Apr. 10, 1866.  
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legally dead, the National Constitution recognizes only free persons, 
and with equal sacredness guarantees the rights of them all. In the light 
of the Constitution, the rights of the four millions of freedmen are as 
full and perfect, as holy and inviolable as are the rights of any other 
four millions of free persons within the United States.213 
The editorials we have recounted above214 do not, for the most part, 
specifically address the issue of the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 
 
 213. To Honest Conservatives, ST. LOUIS MO. DEMOCRAT, Apr. 10, 1866.  The editorial adds: 
Slavery was recognized by the Constitution, but freedmen as distinguished from freemen 
or “free persons” are not so recognized. The freedmen are, under the National flag and 
Constitution, absolutely free, part and parcel of “the people of the United States,” and 
have as valid a claim to the benefit of a Republican form of government as their white 
fellow citizens. If the Southern States will concede this claim the controversy will then 
end; but if not, the duty of enforcing the claim is by the Constitution in the most explicit 
terms devolved upon the General Government. 
Id. 
 214. One final editorial that bears mention is from the Baltimore Sun, on April 24, 1866: 
  In the reflections which we have heretofore submitted to the public in connection 
with the civil rights bill, we stated that our objections to the measure rested not upon the 
kind of protection which it affords to negroes for persons or property, but because 
legislation of that character on the part of Congress was beyond the scope of its 
constitutional powers, and an invasion of the plain line of separation between State and 
federal authority. Regarding the restraints of the constitution as the efficient means for 
preserving our institutions, we estimated any overthrow of constitutional barriers not by 
its immediate practical consequence, but by the unbridled license of arbitrary power, 
which thenceforth would have no check but its own caprice. Stating in this manner the 
magnitude of the evil we contemplated, we further argued that there was no justification 
or adequate [unreadable] in the exigency of circumstances for such usurpation of power 
by Congress—for that the people whom this law was designed to protect had, in most 
cases already the benefit of its provisions; that under the laws of the several States they 
are already secure in their persons and property, and that it is neither the purpose nor the 
interest of the white race to disturb them in the just fruition of the returns of honest 
industry. Our further argument was that the mutual wants and dependences of capital and 
labor, to say nothing of higher moral considerations, were rapidly adjusting the two races 
to the altered circumstances which the overthrow of slavery has occasioned, and that 
without the aid of legislation an intelligent regard for their mutual interest is solving 
much more rapidly, healthfully and happily the social problems of the times than 
legislation by the federal government possibly can. That we have not misapprehended or 
overstated the sentiment of the people of Maryland in the views we have expressed, the 
resolutions adopted by the mass meeting of the citizens of Somerset county on the 10th 
may be [unreadable] as one proof, wherein it is declared that since the amendment of the 
Federal constitution abolishing slavery it is our duty to favor all legislation necessary to 
protect the enjoyment of his freedom and personal rights, but protesting against all 
attempts to make him the special object of national favoritism, etc. 
  But, a reference to the actual legislation of the State will be accepted as perhaps 
more convincing and more substantial proof of what The Sun said, and may serve the 
further purpose of correcting some false impressions in regard to our laws, which, 
through accident, design, or ignorance, may have found [unreadable] in some minds. 
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1866 for interracial marriages. These editorials do, however, all make 
clear that it was widely if not universally understood that the Act 
guaranteed equality with respect to civil rights albeit not with respect to 
political rights. At a bare minimum, most people reading these editorials 
must have thought that once the bill became a law it would give to 
African Americans the same common law rights as were enjoyed by 
white citizens. Since a white citizen had a common law right to marry a 
white citizen, an African American citizen must have obtained the 
“same” right under the Civil Rights Act of 1866. To the extent that 
people did not expect this, they were willfully misleading themselves by 
failing to consider the plain meaning of the text that had become law. 
We agree with Yale Law Professor Jack Balkin that it is not the 
original expected applications of a legal text that bind us, but it is instead 
the words that are enacted into law.215 It is thus irrelevant whether 
people in 1866 expected the Civil Rights Act to confer a right to racial 
intermarriage. What matters instead is what the Act said given the 
original public meaning of the words used at the time it was enacted into 
law. The editorials we have surveyed offer no hope to those who would 
claim that the Act somehow banned the Black Codes while allowing for 
 
While the condition of servitude existed in Maryland, it was considered essential for the 
security of the institution that the free negro population should be subjected to many 
disabilities, and that the number of that class should be restricted as far as possible. 
Hence the enactments which prohibited free negroes from coming into the State, and 
prohibited those who had left the State from returning under severe penalties; hence the 
stringent provisions in regard to the arrest of the vagrants, and the regulations in respect 
to their violations of contracts for hiring, and many other restrictions of the same class, 
and designed to carry out the same general1 policy. All of these disabling laws have, 
without exception, been repealed at the very first session of the Legislature after the 
adoption of the present constitution by which slavery in Maryland was . . . 
extinguished. . . . 
  But the legislation of the State has not stopped with the removal of the disabilities 
which attached to the enjoyment of liberty and property by the Negro. The law of 
[unreadable] March, 1865, chapter [unreadable], section 119, provides for the 
establishment of public schools for the instruction of the colored people of the State, by 
setting apart the entire school tax levied upon the colored people of the State for that 
purpose, to be under the control of the educational board of the State, as is the school 
system for whites. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . By a comparison of these laws with the provisions of the civil rights bill, it will be 
further discovered that there is no likelihood of the aid of that beneficent piece of 
legislation being invoked amongst us.  
The Laws of Maryland and the Civil Rights Bill, BALT. SUN, Apr. 24, 1866. 
 215. Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s Originalism, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 663 (2009). 
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a later generation of Jim Crow laws. The language of the Civil Rights 
Act in conferring equal rights of contract on persons of every race and 
color to make the same contracts white people could make is 
unequivocal. We think the editorials we have surveyed lead to the same 
conclusion as did the dictionaries that we surveyed. The Civil Rights Act 
of 1866 gave African Americans the same right to enter into marriage 
contracts with white citizens as was enjoyed by white citizens. Loving v. 
Virginia is thus correct as a matter of the original meaning of the Civil 
Rights Act and therefore of the Fourteenth Amendment as well. 
V. THE CASE LAW ON RACIAL INTERMARRIAGE IN THE 1870S AND 
LATER 
Prior to the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, there had been 
a very long history in the United States of legal bans on racial 
intermarriage.216 As Cyrus E. Phillips IV explains: 
Prohibitions against miscegenation date back to the earliest colonial 
times, and the first record of sanctions imposed for this act in the 
Virginia colony appears in Hening’s extract from the judicial 
proceedings of the Governor and Council of Virginia: 
September 17th, 1630. Hugh Davis to be soundly whipped, before 
an assembly of negroes and others for abusing himself to the 
dishonor of God and shame of Christians, by defiling his body in 
lying with a negro; which fault he is to acknowledge next Sabbath 
day. 
That prohibitions against miscegenation have been widespread in the 
United States can be seen in the fact that they have appeared in the 
statutes of some forty states. Of these forty, twenty-three [had repealed 
their statutes by the time of the decision in Loving v. Virginia but 
seventeen states had not done so.]217 
It is sad to say, but by 1866 laws against racial intermarriage were 
deeply rooted in American history and tradition. 
The question, which arose after the adoption of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866, was whether the Act barred state laws prohibiting 
miscegenation. Our analysis here has benefitted from a blog post by 
 
 216. PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION LAW AND THE MAKING 
OF RACE IN AMERICA (2009). 
 217. Cyrus E. Phillips IV, Miscegenation: The Courts and the Constitution, 8 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 133, 133 (1966) (citation omitted). 
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David Koppel on The Volokh Conspiracy.218 We discovered this post 
only after writing the analysis in this Article up to this page, and Kopel’s 
post, which relies on a book by Peggy Pascoe called What Comes 
Naturally: Miscegenation Law and the Making of Race in America,219 is 
especially helpful to our argument in this essay. Kopel notes that the first 
state Supreme Court decision to address the question of whether the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 banned state anti-miscegenation laws came in the 
Alabama Supreme Court’s decision in 1872 in Burns v. State220. 
Strikingly, the Alabama Supreme Court said in 1872 that “the state’s 
1866 constitutional ban on miscegenation violated the ‘cardinal 
principle’ of the Civil Rights Act and of the Equal Protection clause.”221 
The Alabama constitutional provision in question was added to the 
state constitution in 1866 when the Alabama state legislature first 
reconstituted itself after the end of the Civil War and was dominated by 
ex-Confederate forces.222 Other southern states passed similar anti-
miscegenation laws at the same time as the adoption of the Black 
Codes.223 In 1867, a new Reconstruction government held a new election 
in Alabama in which large numbers of freed African Americans were 
eligible to vote for the first time.224 This expanded electorate produced a 
three judge white Republican dominated state supreme court. It was that 
new state supreme court which held in 1872 that the 1866 anti-
miscegenation law violated the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the 
Fourteenth Amendment.225 
The 1872 Alabama Supreme Court adopted the reasoning we set 
forth in Part III of this Article as to why the 1866 anti-miscegenation law 
violated the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The unanimous state supreme court in Burns said: 
 
 218. David Kopel, The Original Meaning of the 14th Amendment Regarding Interracial 
Marriage, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, (Dec. 5, 2011, 5:39 PM), http://volokh.com/2011 /12/05/the-
original-meaning-of-the-14th-amendment-regarding-interracial-marriage; see also Michael Ramsey, 
THE ORIGINALISM BLOG (Dec. 6, 2011, 07:00 AM), http://originalism blog.typepad.com/the-
originalism-blog/2011/12/originalism-in-the-blogsmichael-ramsey-1.html (reposting David Kopel’s 
post).  
 219. PASCOE,  supra note 216. 
 220. 48 Ala. 195 (1872). 
 221. Kopel, supra note 218. 
 222. PASCOE, supra note 216, at 29–30, 57–58. 
 223. Id. at 28–30. 
 224. FONER, supra note 53, at 314. 
 225. PASCOE, supra note 216, at 58. 
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Marriage is a civil contract, and in that character alone is dealt with by 
the municipal law. The same right to make a contract as is enjoyed by 
white citizens, means the right to make any contract which a white 
citizen may make. The law intended to destroy the distinctions of race 
and color in respect to the rights secured by it. It did not aim to create 
merely an equality of the races in reference to each other. If so, laws 
prohibiting the races from suing each other, giving evidence for or 
against, or dealing with one another, would be permissible. The very 
excess to which such a construction would lead is conclusive against 
it.226 
The Burns court adds: 
One of the rights conferred by citizenship, therefore, is that of suing 
any other citizen. The civil rights bill now confers this right upon the 
negro in express terms, as also the right to make and enforce contracts, 
amongst which is that of marriage with any citizen capable of entering 
into that relation.227 
The Burns opinion obviously reads the text of the Civil Rights Act 
and of the Fourteenth Amendment, which constitutionalizes it, in exactly 
the same way we do in Part III of this Article. The right to marry is the 
right to make a certain kind of contract, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
gives African Americans “the right to make any contract which a white 
citizen may make.”228 Since a white citizen could make a contract to 
marry a white citizen, it follows inexorably that citizens of any race or 
color could also make such a contract. 
Kopel goes on to note in his blog post that the Texas Supreme Court 
unanimously ruled in 1872 in Bonds v. Foster, an inheritance case, that 
“the law prohibiting such a [common law] marriage [between a white 
and a black] had been abrogated by the 14th Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States.”229 The Texas Supreme Court thus 
reached the same conclusion, in 1872, as had the Alabama Supreme 
Court. Kopel cites Pascoe’s book for the striking proposition that “in the 
years after the Civil War, eleven states repealed their bans on interracial 
marriage.”230 This suggests that condemnation of interracial marriage 
 
 226. Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195, 197 (1872), overruled by Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877). 
 227. Id. at 198. 
 228. Id. at 197. 
 229. Bonds v. Foster, 36 Tex. 68, 69–70 (1871) (inheritance case), quoted in Kopel, supra 
note 218. 
 230. Kopel, supra note 218. 
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was perhaps not as widespread during Reconstruction as Professor 
Alexander Bickel’s analysis, discussed in Part II of this Article above, 
might otherwise have suggested. 
This fact and the two southern supreme court opinions in Alabama 
and Texas protecting a right to interracial marriage are especially striking 
because the year before those two decisions were handed down, the 
Indiana Supreme Court sitting in a northern state reached the exact 
opposite conclusion on the constitutionality of bans on interracial 
marriage in a case called State v. Gibson.231 The Indiana Supreme Court 
concluded in Gibson in 1871 that marriage was more than a contractual 
relationship because it led to a special kind of social and civil status or 
institution. As the Gibson court said, “The right, in the states, to regulate 
and control, to guard, protect, and preserve this God-given, civilizing, 
and Christianizing institution is of inestimable importance, and cannot be 
surrendered.”232 For that reason, it concluded that the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to anti-miscegenation 
laws.233 As Kopel points out, this holding was especially influential 
because the Indiana Supreme Court was a northern state supreme court, a 
fact which made Gibson “the essential citation.”234 
The Burns decision was eventually overruled by the Alabama 
Supreme Court in 1877, after the end of Reconstruction, in Green v. 
State.235 The groundwork for this decision was laid in 1874 when the 
Democrats regained their majority control of the Alabama state 
legislature and the state supreme court. The new anti-Reconstruction 
supreme-court majority in Green asked: 
Is marriage . . . nothing more than a civil contract? Is it, “in that 
character alone,” dealt with by the municipal law? 
 Doubtless, it is by a contract—that is, by the agreement of the 
parties—that they enter into the state of marriage. But, as was said by 
the Supreme Court of Delaware, it is a contract “of a peculiar character 
and subject to peculiar principles. It may be entered into by persons 
who are not capable of forming any other lawful contract; it can be 
violated and annulled by law, which no other contract can be; and its 
rights and obligations are derived rather from the law relating to it, than 
 
 231. State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389 (1871). 
 232. Id. at 403. 
 233. Id. at 405. 
 234. Kopel, supra note 218. 
 235. Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877). 
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from the contract itself.” According to Judge Story: “Marriage is not 
treated as a mere contract between the parties, subject as to its 
continuance, dissolution and effects, to their mere pleasure and 
intentions. But it is treated as a civil institution, the most interesting and 
important in its nature, of any in society.”236 
The Green court thus rejected the argument that marriage was 
covered by the liberty of contract that was protected against racial 
discrimination by the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The court concluded by saying that “[t]he amendments to 
the Constitution were evidently designed to secure to citizens, without 
distinction of race, rights of a civil or political kind only—not such as are 
merely social, much less those of a purely domestic nature. The 
regulation of these belongs to the States.”237 
As Kopel notes, the Texas Intermediate Court of Appeals reached the 
same conclusion in 1877 in Frasher v. State.238 The court in that case 
held: 
Marriage is not a contract protected by the Constitution of the United 
States, or within the meaning of the Civil Rights Bill. Marriage is more 
than a contract within the meaning of the act. It is a civil status, left 
solely by the Federal Constitution and the laws to the discretion of the 
states, under their general power to regulate their domestic affairs.239 
Kopel goes on to say perceptively: 
The regressive Frasher decision is one more data point in support of 
the observation in Henry Sumner Maine’s great 1861 book Ancient 
Law: “we may say that the movement of the progressive societies has 
hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.” Maine’s book 
elaborates in great detail why marriage law fits this paradigm.240 
By the time the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of the 
constitutionality of a state law that penalized interracial marriage, 
Reconstruction was clearly at an end. In Pace v. Alabama, Justice 
 
 236. Id. at 193 (citation omitted) (quoting Townsend v. Griffin, 4 Del. 440, 442 (1846)). For 
another contemporaneous account articulating this reasoning, see JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND 
REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND 
JUDGMENTS § 200, at 168 (1834). 
 237. Green, 58 Ala. at 196. 
 238. Kopel, supra note 218 (noting Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. Ct. App. 263 (1877). 
 239. Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. Ct. App. 263, 276 (1877)  (emphasis omitted). 
 240. Kopel, supra note 218. 
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Stephen Field upheld Alabama’s anti-miscegenation law for a unanimous 
court.241 The case involved Tony Pace, an African American man, who 
was living with Mary Cox, a white woman.242 They were prosecuted in 
1881 for living together in an extra-marital sexual relationship contrary 
to a law that penalized interracial, extra-marital relationships more 
harshly than similar relationships between two white people or two black 
people.243 Under the 1866 Alabama State Constitution, as reinterpreted 
in Green v. State, it would have been illegal for Pace and Cox to marry. 
Pace and Cox were convicted and sentenced in 1882 to two years in jail, 
and they appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court challenging the 
constitutionality of the 1866 ban on interracial marriage and 
fornication.244 The court upheld the law saying: 
The evil tendency of the crime of . . . adultery or fornication is greater 
when it is committed between persons of the two races . . . . Its result 
may be the amalgamation of the two races, producing a mongrel 
population and a degraded civilization, the prevention of which is 
dictated by a sound public policy affecting the highest interests of 
society and government.245 
Pace appealed his conviction to the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
decided the case during the same year in which it botched The Civil 
Rights Cases.246 
Pace argued that Alabama discriminated on the basis of race when it 
punished interracial fornication and adultery more harshly than the same 
acts when committed between two white people or two black people.247 
Justice Field’s opinion began by conceding that the Civil Rights Act 
forbade any discrimination in civil rights on the basis of race.248 Justice 
Field said, however, that 
[t]he defect in the argument of counsel consists in his assumption that 
any discrimination is made by the laws of Alabama . . . . The two 
 
 241. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883), overruled in part by McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 
U.S. 184, 188 (1964). 
 242. Id. at 584. 
 243. Id. at 583–84. 
 244. Id. at 584. 
 245. Pace v. State, 69 Ala. 231, 232 (1881). 
 246. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 247. Pace, 106 U.S. at 584. 
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sections of the code cited are entirely consistent. The one prescribes, 
generally, a punishment for an offence committed between persons of 
different sexes; the other prescribes a punishment for an offence which 
can only be committed where the two sexes are of different races. 
There is in neither section any discrimination against either race. Sect. 
4184 equally includes the offence when the persons of the two sexes 
are both white and when they are both black. Sect. 4189 applies the 
same punishment to both offenders, the white and the black. Indeed, the 
offence against which this latter section is aimed cannot be committed 
without involving the persons of both races in the same punishment. 
Whatever discrimination is made in the punishment prescribed in the 
two sections is directed against the offence designated and not against 
the person of any particular color or race. The punishment of each 
offending person, whether white or black, is the same.249 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Pace v. Alabama was joined even 
by Justice John Marshall Harlan, who dissented in The Civil Rights 
Cases250 and later in Plessy v. Ferguson.251 It is ironic, to say the least, 
that the case came out of Alabama—the very same state whose state 
supreme court in 1872 had said that bans on racial intermarriage violated 
the “cardinal principle” of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.252 Justice Field’s analysis was perfunctory, 
unpersuasive, and failed even to cite or respond to the Alabama and 
Texas State Supreme Court rulings in 1872, which had reached the 
opposite conclusion.253 It was a thoroughly disgraceful performance. 
As David Kopel points out, the acceptance of the constitutionality of 
bans on racial intermarriage and sexual relationships laid the critical 
groundwork for the whole edifice of Jim Crow era segregation. Once it 
became permissible to outlaw racial intermarriage, why would it be 
impermissible to deny interracial seating on railroad trains? As Kopel 
says: 
By the time that Plessy v. Ferguson was decided in 1896, the Supreme 
Court majority, which was willfully oblivious to contemporary social 
reality (e.g., if blacks consider a segregation mandate to be a “badge of 
 
 249. Id. at 585. 
 250. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 251. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 252. Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195, 198 (1872); PASCOE, supra note 216, at 58 (“[T]he Alabama 
Supreme Court declared the Alabama miscegenation law unconstitutional on the ground that it was 
in direct opposition to the ‘cardinal principle’ of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantee of equal protection.”). 
 253. Burns, 48 Ala. at 195; Bonds v. Foster, 36 Tex. 68 (1871) (inheritance case). 
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inferiority,” that is “solely because the colored race chooses to put that 
construction upon it”), was also lazily ignorant of legal history: “Laws 
forbidding the intermarriage of the two races may be said in a technical 
sense to interfere with the freedom of contact, [sic] and yet have been 
universally recognized as within the police power of the state.” The 
sole citation for this allegedly “universal” recognition was [the Indiana 
State Supreme Court’s 1871 decision in] State v. Gibson. The Court 
was right that as of 1895, miscegenation laws were constitutionally 
safe, but the Court seemed quite unaware that during the first years 
when the 14th Amendment and the Civil Rights Act were the law of the 
land, the issue was in dispute.254 
Pace v. Alabama suggested to the majority in Plessy that there was a 
whole sphere of so-called social rights, as to which race discrimination 
was allowed, which sphere was separate and apart from the civil rights 
protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and by the Fourteenth 
Amendment and from the political rights of African American men 
protected by the Fifteenth Amendment. The fact that the great 
Reconstruction texts make no mention of these supposed social rights 
was simply overlooked and was swept under the rug. 
The majorities in Pace v. Alabama and in Plessy v. Ferguson never 
asked themselves whether it was at all plausible that a constitution which 
guaranteed African American men the political right to vote could 
somehow sanction depriving American citizens of their civil right to 
marry anyone they so chose without regard to race. The Reconstruction 
framers made it clear over and over again that the political right to vote 
was a right that was at the apex of the pyramid of rights while civil 
rights, like the right to marry, were at the pyramid’s base.255 Under the 
reasoning of the Reconstruction Congress, it is implausible that African 
American men might be given the political right to vote but might be 
denied the civil right to marry anyone of whatever race they chose.256 If 
someone can be trusted to vote for President, Senator, or Governor, 
surely that person can make a contract to sit in the same railway car as 
white people or to marry a white person. 
The post-Reconstruction cases from 1871 to 1896 are important 
because they show the validity of the semantic-meaning arguments we 
make in Part III, after consulting Reconstruction dictionaries, and in Part 
 
 254. Kopel, supra note 218 (citations omitted). 
 255. Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. 
REV. 1, 47–48 (2011). 
 256. Id. 
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IV, after consulting Reconstruction editorials. Real state supreme court 
justices in Alabama and in Texas in 1872 read the text of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment and came to the exact same 
conclusions as to its implications for racial intermarriage as we have 
argued for in Parts III and IV above. The hard, plain-meaning textualist 
reading we give to the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was the very same 
reading given to that Act by two pro-Reconstruction state supreme 
courts. Were the justices on those courts biased toward Reconstruction? 
Maybe to some degree they were, as were arguably the congresses that 
produced the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments. Conversely, the Alabama Supreme Court justices who 
took away the right to racial intermarriage in 1877 were undoubtedly 
biased against Reconstruction, and even at the height of Reconstruction, 
there was blatant racism in the South and throughout the country. 
The point here is that our hard, plain-meaning textual reading of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 as protecting a right to racial intermarriage was 
quite plausible to legal interpreters at the time of Reconstruction. We 
have not conjured up some bizarre law professor’s reading of the legal 
texts that went unnoticed at the time. To the contrary, our view was 
initially the law in Alabama and Texas after 1872. 
The U.S. Supreme Court eventually overruled Pace v. Alabama and 
held anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional in Loving v. Virginia.257 
This Article has attempted to show that, notwithstanding statements in 
the legislative history, the original public meaning of the text of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 and of the Fourteenth Amendment strongly supports 
the outcome in Loving. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in Loving, as 
in Brown v. Board of Education, remained spooked by a legislative 
history that should have been irrelevant to its decision. The Court 
expressed its queasiness in the following paragraph: 
The State argues that statements in the Thirty-ninth Congress about the 
time of the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment indicate that the 
Framers did not intend the Amendment to make unconstitutional state 
miscegenation laws. Many of the statements alluded to by the State 
concern the debates over the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, which President 
Johnson vetoed, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, enacted 
over his veto. While these statements have some relevance to the 
intention of Congress in submitting the Fourteenth Amendment, it must 
be understood that they pertained to the passage of specific statutes and 
 
 257. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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not to the broader, organic purpose of a constitutional amendment. As 
for the various statements directly concerning the Fourteenth 
Amendment, we have said in connection with a related problem, that 
although these historical sources “cast some light” they are not 
sufficient to resolve the problem; “[a]t best, they are inconclusive. The 
most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly 
intended them to remove all legal distinctions among ‘all persons born 
or naturalized in the United States.’ Their opponents, just as certainly, 
were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments 
and wished them to have the most limited effect.”258 
The opinion in Loving is spooked quite unnecessarily by the 
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. At the same time, the Supreme Court seemed incapable of 
making a hard, plain-meaning textual argument, even though all the 
material for such an argument was right before them. 
Once one applies the original public-meaning textualism of Justices 
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas to this problem, all difficulties 
disappear. The statutes that banned racial intermarriage and that forbade 
African Americans from sitting in the same railway cars as white 
Americans did not give “the same right . . . to citizens of every race and 
color . . . to make or enforce contracts . . . as was enjoyed by white 
citizens.”259 The Alabama Supreme Court figured this all out back in 
1872 in Burns v. State when it said that under the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 an African American could make any contract that a white 
American could make. 
There is the argument of Green v. State that marriage contracts are 
unique in that they create a legal status, but this argument overlooks the 
fact that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 on its face applies to all contracts. 
Surely marriage is at least in part a matter of contract and is therefore 
within the protection of the 1866 Civil Rights Act. Even if it were not, 
marriage is clearly a Privilege or Immunity under the Fourteenth 
 
 258. Id. at 9 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954)); see also id. at 10 
(“We have rejected the proposition that the debates in the Thirty-ninth Congress or in the state 
legislatures which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment supported the theory advanced by the State, 
that the requirement of equal protection of the laws is satisfied by penal laws defining offenses based 
on racial classifications so long as white and Negro participants in the offense were similarly 
punished.” (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964))); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 
U.S. 303, 310 (1879). 
 259. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
1981 (2012)). 
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Amendment,260 which cannot be abridged on the basis of race, just as 
marriage is clearly a Privilege and Immunity under Article IV as to 
which states may not discriminate with respect to out-of-staters.261 
The bottom line is that it is not the original, public-meaning Justices 
on the U.S. Supreme Court whose theories of constitutional 
interpretation cannot account for Loving v. Virginia and who cannot say 
that Pace v. Alabama was wrong the day it was decided in 1883. The 
Justices who cannot explain Loving are the ones who accord primacy to 
doctrine and case law, as Chief Justice Roberts seems to do, or Justice 
Stephen Breyer, who would defer to the people’s democratically 
expressed sentiments. It is Justice Breyer’s approach that leads to Pace v. 
Alabama and to Plessy, not Justice Scalia or Justice Thomas’s. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
At the end of the Civil War, the United States engaged in its greatest 
experiment in social change since the Founding. The process of bringing 
three million people from slavery to freedom, which some may argue is 
still unfinished, was bitterly contested. Building a consensus in a 
democracy is difficult by design, but perhaps no struggle has been as 
labored or as important as achieving equal rights for Americans 
regardless of race. A key problem was the question of exactly what civil 
rights had the freed African Americans obtained when slavery was 
abolished in 1865. As Senator Lyman Trumbull said during the debates 
on the Civil Rights Act of 1866: 
It is difficult, perhaps, to define accurately what slavery is and what 
liberty is. Liberty and slavery are opposite terms; one is opposed to the 
other . . . . 
“Civil liberty is no other than natural liberty, so far restrained by human 
laws, and no further, as is necessary and expedient for the general 
advantage of the public.”262 
We contend that by virtue of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the 
Fourteenth Amendment that the freedmen gained the same right to marry 
a white person or to sit in the best railway car on a train as was enjoyed 
 
 260. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 261. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
 262. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 474 (1866) (Senator Lyman Trumbull’s remarks in 
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by white citizens. Our position is supported by the text, albeit not by the 
legislative history, of the 1866 Act and the Fourteenth Amendment. 
We think that legislatures write and pass laws, while it is the job of 
the courts to give those enacted texts their objective original public 
meaning when judges construe the texts. It is our position that in this 
process, courts must interpret the laws according to the plain meaning of 
the text as it would have been generally understood by the objective 
meaning of its language at the time of enactment. We hold to this 
conclusion particularly in times when the plain meaning of the text may 
be at odds with the legislative history surrounding its enactment—a view 
that is not shared by all jurists, legal scholars, or originalists but that is 
associated with the originalism of Justice Antonin Scalia. Unfortunately, 
the law of civil rights and of racial equality in the United States is a case 
study in the consequences of botched efforts at judicial interpretation. At 
multiple critical moments during the struggle for civil rights, faulty 
judicial interpretations of legislation and of the Constitution hamstrung 
efforts to protect freedom and corrupted the original understanding of the 
legislative and constitutional provisions that were before the federal 
courts. 
Originalists—starting with Raoul Berger, who was an advocate of 
original intent—have struggled to construe Reconstruction era legislation 
regarding civil rights. This is due to the fact that originalism started out 
advocating original intent and only evolved into advocacy of the original 
public meaning of legal texts under the intellectual leadership of Justice 
Scalia. We think Scalia is right and that Raoul Berger was wrong. 
Applying Scalia-style textualism here, we conclude the Fourteenth 
Amendment did secure a constitutional right to racial intermarriage. 
Lawmaking and constitution-making are public acts. Words in a 
proposed statute or constitutional amendment must be given their 
original public meaning because it is that meaning that would have led 
constituents to speak about proposed laws and voice their preferences to 
their elected representatives, and it is that meaning that might have led to 
the offering in Congress of proposed amendments. In communicating 
legislative preferences to their elected representatives, constituents can 
only act on the basis of giving the proposed text its original public 
meaning. The secret “understandings” of legislators about what a text 
“really” means will not be known to the democratic polity whose 
representative will enact a text and then enforce it in the executive and 
judicial branches. After all it is “We the People” acting through “Our” 
elected representatives who determine whether or not legislation will 
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pass in Congress and be signed by the President. A bill may mean one 
thing to a senator or congressman, but it is the original public meaning of 
a bill that will determine the public’s view of the bill and therefore a 
representative’s vote. It is for this reason that courts ought to rely more 
on dictionaries than they do on legislative history. A congress that knows 
that courts will interpret what it passes literally will take more care in 
drafting bills and will pay more attention to precision in legal texts. In 
contrast, a congress that thinks courts will pay attention to legislative 
history will become sloppy in drafting legal texts. It is the text and not 
the legislative history that is voted on in both Houses of Congress and 
which the President signs or vetoes. We should employ rules of statutory 
and constitutional construction that give Congress an incentive to pay 
attention to the texts that it passes. 
We have discussed above the fundamental change in Supreme Court 
doctrine that occurred between the holding in Pace v. Alabama and 
Plessy v. Ferguson263 and the contrary holding in Loving v. Virginia, 
which overruled Pace. It is commonly thought that Scalia-style 
originalism cannot explain or justify the outcome in Loving v. Virginia. 
We think we have shown in this Article that this is not the case. The 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 gave African 
Americans the same right as is enjoyed by white citizens either to marry 
a white citizen or to contract to ride in a certain railway car on a train. 
Pace v. Alabama and Plessy v. Ferguson were thus both wrong on the 
day they were decided as well as being wrong on May 17, 1954, when 
Brown v. Board of Education was decided.264 No evolution in 
constitutional meaning was needed to justify Brown or Loving v. 
Virginia. The Fourteenth Amendment mandates color blindness as to all 
civil rights and has done so from the time of its adoption in 1868. It is 
Scalia-style originalism that explains Loving v. Virginia just as it is the 
advocates of legislative history who cannot explain that great case. 
 
 
 263. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 264. We believe segregation in public schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment as well as 
racial restrictions in contract law violated that amendment. The argument is sufficiently complex, 
however, to require treatment in a separate, additional law review article, which we are now in the 
process of writing. 
